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Why is the response to H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza 
(HPAI) so challenged in Indonesia? Why did the virus spread so fast, 
and why has the disease persisted? Are there features of the 
country and its culture that encourage or inhibit the disease? Is the 
internationally led response appropriately sensitive to local 
contexts? This paper suggests that distinctive social, cultural, 
economic and political factors work against a technocratic 
response such as has been employed in Indonesia. The paper 
explores the interactions between global bio-medicine, a mesh of 
power relations linking health, industry, institutionalism and 
governance, and Indonesia’s diverse and complex political and 
social contexts. How is an infectious zoonotic disease controlled in 
a dynamic environment where modernist models of authority and 
rationality are unproven?
Since H5N1 was first detected in central Java in mid-2003, it has 
spread to 31 of Indonesia’s 33 provinces, caused the death or 
destruction of at least 150 million poultry birds, and killed over 
110 humans. The international response, which began in mid-2005, 
has focused on animal surveillance, control and vaccination, human 
health system capacity building, and information and behaviour 
change communications. The response is challenged by the size, 
geography and infrastructure of the country, an exuberant 
democracy and extensive decentralization. Other diseases, 
sectarian tensions and regular natural disasters overshadow the 
threat of HPAI to human health and food security. Nevertheless, 
issues of trust between science, government, business and civil 
society, and nationalism, are shown to be key, as are the varying 
constructions of risk, public goods and governance associated with 
the international organizations driving the response, and the people 
affected by the disease.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Tek kotek kotek 
Anak ayam turun sepuluh 
Mati satu, turun sembilan… 
 
Cheep-cheep, cheep-cheep, cheep-cheep 
Ten baby chickens run around 
Then one dies, and nine survive…  
 
Popular nursery rhyme heard in Majalengka, West Java, 17 August 2008 
to be repeated, counting down…  
 
Indonesia is more affected by H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) than any country in the 
world. Since 2003, when it was first detected in central Java, HPAI has spread to 31 out of 33 
provinces, caused $470 million in economic losses
1
, disrupted the livelihoods of over 10 million 
people who are dependent on the poultry industry
2
, and killed 113 people out of 139 confirmed 
human cases, mainly children and young adults
3
. Indonesia has also received the largest financial 
commitment to fight avian influenza from the international community, totalling over $128 million
4
. 
This has resulted in huge programmes of surveillance, culling, vaccination, and information and 
behaviour change communications, led largely by United Nations agencies, and some improvements 
to the health system. Despite these efforts, HPAI remains endemic in Java, Sumatra, Bali and Sulawesi, 
and sporadic outbreaks continue to be reported in other areas
5
. 
 
Historically, and today, Indonesia experiences economic uncertainty, inadequate infrastructure, and 
regular natural and unnatural disasters, as well as separatist agitation and intermittent sectarian 
violence. The size and geography of the country also conspire against an easy response to avian 
influenza, and complex social, cultural, and political factors are at work. Over half of all households 
keep poultry at home, and chickens, together with other birds, play an important role in culture and 
provide the poorest with something to eat and trade. Indonesia is also a numinous culture. Fatalism 
and humility prevail in the face of threats from the natural world in particular. Despite being an ideal 
                                                     
1
 KOMNAS Presentation, 10th National Veterinary Conference of the Indonesian Medical Association, Bogor, 20 
August 2008. 
2
 http://www.nzaid.govt.nz/programmes/c-indonesia.html accessed 7 November 2008 
3
 WHO: Avian influenza – situation in Indonesia – update 45 9 December 2008 available at 
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2008_12_09/en/index.html accessed 22 December 2008 
4
 UNISIC & World Bank (2008) 
5
 FAO (2008) 
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place for a human influenza pandemic to start, there is little popular conception of such an event, 
and poor comprehension of its consequences. Understanding policy processes must take such 
contexts into account. How risks are understood, and how responses are framed, are very much 
located in particular ecological, social and political contexts, and Indonesia presents its own distinct 
set. 
 
Politically, Indonesia is a dynamic young democracy emerging from 40 years of autocratic rule. 
Created out of political repression, economic hardship and the triumph of people power, today's 
political environment might be characterised as a democracy in formation where protest is usually 
met by political compromise. This makes any robust response to AI politically challenging. At the 
national level, and at that of 456 autonomous districts and municipalities, there is little trust in 
government. This is sometimes justified. Despite good intentions, all post-1997 administrations have 
suffered a degree of continuity with those of the past, which were characterised by institutionalised 
corruption, opaque processes and collusion with business interests. 
 
Then, as now, the government faced numerous distractions, and it has not interacted significantly 
with either the industrial poultry sector, which is used to being autonomous and self-sufficient, or the 
millions of small farmers, who are also used to being autonomous and self-sufficient. Trust again is 
central. Does the government have any great competence? Does it have any right, or rights, to 
demand action? This complex relationship between the state and its bureaucracy – a vast, 
decentralised network of local governments and administrations – and the people, be they peasants 
or industrialists, is central to understanding the policy processes surrounding the emergence of avian 
influenza in Indonesia, and the responses to it. As this paper shows, the relationship is neither 
straightforward nor fixed, and has led to a situation that is challenging the ideal plans of the 
government, its donor supporters, and the implementing agencies. 
 
All Indonesian poultry production is consumed by the domestic market and imports are negligible. 
Chicken is Indonesia’s favourite meat, and around ten conglomerate companies control all industrial 
production, with three responsible for 70% of the market. Most integrators operate at least partially 
under sub-contracting schemes that see poultry, material associated with poultry production, and 
waste products, widely transported about the countryside. Small scale ‘backyard’ and village farmers 
also make a significant contribution to production, and hobbyists abound. Although both groups are 
keen to blame the other, the nub of the problem does not lie in industrial farming, or in backyard 
farming, but in the interactions between them, and the widespread movements of poultry products 
associated with both. Only now are the results of detailed studies becoming available, with markets 
and market-related movements becoming more clearly implicated in the spread of the virus. 
 
The HPAI response has been led by international agencies, operating in emergency mode. The Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), working with the Indonesian Ministry of 
Agriculture, has been in the front line, creating and implementing disease control plans designed, and 
led, by veterinarians and public health experts. The scale of the problem is awesome, however, and 
technical, science-led, approaches such as vaccination are proving challenging to implement in 
village and backyard settings. The need to understand and get involved with critical issues such as 
compensation for culling, for example, which involves disbursement of small sums of money to large 
numbers of people, adds huge complexity, some of it political. 
 
Communications, led by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and organizations such as 
Development Alternatives, Inc., have been more fragmented but no less extensive. Very successful in 
raising awareness, they have affected long lasting attitude or behaviour change less convincingly. The 
United Nations World Health Organization (WHO) has been faced with the most extreme political 
difficulties, despite pressing needs for fundamental scientific research and improvements to a low-
level healthcare system. It has however added important specific capacity. 
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This international architecture, whilst faced with its own internal challenges of priorities, cultures, co-
ordination and trust, is also charged with co-ordinating and building relations with national, provincial 
and regional government and non-government agencies, and individuals, as well as civil society, in an 
atmosphere of charged nationalism and complex politics. Just as the people are suspicious of the 
government, the government is suspicious of the global community. This leads to a larger question: 
how will Indonesia – at the epicentre of the global avian influenza epidemic – choose to relate to the 
rest of the world, which is fearful of the consequences of a human pandemic? Here tough geopolitical 
debates about equity, public goods and global responsibilities arise, illustrated most starkly in the 
controversy surrounding virus sharing (see Viruses and sovereignty below). 
 
This paper is the result of three weeks fieldwork in Indonesia in August 2008 that involved interviews 
with 38 individuals
6
. The majority were professionally involved in the avian influenza response, 
although a number had broader interests in politics, economics and society. This followed interviews 
with 59 people involved with avian influenza based in Europe and the US (cf. Scoones and Forster 
2008) and a literature review covering avian influenza, agriculture, health, politics, society and 
economics in Indonesia. This included academic studies, and published and unpublished policy, 
strategy and evaluation documents produced by national and international bodies. Three transect 
walks were accomplished in Jakarta, and two in Majalengka, West Java. A press review covering the 
period 2004 to 2008 provided a wider picture, which was triangulated with data from interviews and 
the literature. For reasons outlined in the paper, the perspectives of the integrated poultry industry 
are not well represented, directly, nor those of the Indonesian Ministry of Health. For reasons of time, 
the concerns and activities of the Association of South East Asian Nations have not been addressed.  
 
The paper first outlines the geographical, economic, ecological, cultural, and historical context of 
Indonesia. A description of political events since 1997 leads to an analysis of the current political 
situation, in particular the challenges posed by decentralization and the legal system. The late 
reporting of the initial HPAI outbreak to the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) is 
investigated, and a time line contrasts major events related to avian influenza with other, competing, 
events. The role of poultry in everyday life and commerce is described, and the responses to avian 
influenza are elucidated through outlines of the roles and activities of the national co-ordinating 
agency, and related national and international bodies. This is divided in sections covering agriculture, 
public health and communications. One objective is to identify both dominant, and neglected, actors, 
networks and narratives (persistent storylines) involved, and their interactions, or the lack of them. 
Finally Indonesia’s recent refusal to share human H5N1 virus samples is investigated, and some 
conclusions are offered. 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS, DANGER AND DIVERSITY 
 
The Republic of Indonesia’s 235 million citizens7 inhabit some 6,000 islands in a 17,508 island 
archipelago that stretches over 5,000 km between mainland South East Asia and Australia. Ranked 
107 out of 177 countries in the UNDP’s 2007/2008 Human Development Index, GDP per capita was 
$3,471 in 2006 (PPP, current international dollars) with 40% of the population living on less than $2 a 
day (Asian Development Bank 2008). Despite a slowing global economy, national economic growth 
reached a ten-year high of 6.3% in 2007 with unemployment falling to 9.1%, exports growing, and the 
balance of payments account showing a surplus (McLeod 2008:185-186, CEIC Asia database
8
). 
Further data for Indonesia is presented in tabular form in Appendix B. 
 
                                                     
6
 See Appendix A 
7
 Nearly every statistic relating to Indonesia needs to be treated with caution. A recent study found a shortfall of 
36 million people in the national electoral roll, for example (Jakarta Post 21/8/08).  
8
 Available at www.ceicdata.com accessed 11 December 2008 
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Rich in natural resources (including petroleum, natural gas, coal, tin, timber, bauxite, copper and 
fertile soils), Indonesia’s location on the edges of three tectonic plates makes it the site of 130 active 
volcanoes and frequent earthquakes and tsunamis. Home to 12% of the world’s mammals, 16% of 
the reptiles and amphibians, 17% of the birds and more than 25% of all marine and freshwater fish, 
agriculture currently engages 44% of the working population and services 38%. In 1980, 22% of the 
population lived in urban areas and in 2002, 42% (Fabiosa 2005:2). Adult male literacy is reported at 
92% and female at 83%
9
. Culturally and economically, the country is dominated by the island of Java 
(the Javanese and the Sundanese from western Java make up over half the Indonesian population), 
which has a remarkably high population density of nearly one thousand people per square kilometre. 
Islam is the dominant religion and Indonesia has the world’s largest Muslim population. Islam 
however is often mixed with other cultural and religious influences including animist, Hindu, Buddhist 
and Christian. Across the country, over 300 ethnic groups speak over 700 languages and dialects.  
 
Under Dutch rule for over 300 years, and one of the Netherlands’ richest colonies in the 1800s, 
Indonesian independence was declared in 1945, recognised in 1949, and until 1965 the country was 
under the authoritarian regime of President Sukarno. This period was characterised by endemic 
corruption and a nationalist, quasi-socialist economic policy that resulted in hyperinflation and 
economic stagnation. An attempted coup in September 1965 was countered by the army and 
subsequently between 500,000 and one million people were killed as alleged communists and 
supporters (Cribb 1990). From 1968, when he was formally appointed, President Suharto reversed 
many of Sukarno’s policies and initiated a ‘New Order’, which saw foreign debt rescheduled, an inflow 
of aid and investment, and significant economic growth: the proportion living below the poverty line 
reduced from around 60% in 1970 to around 11% in 1997. More corrupt and authoritarian than 
Sukarno, Suharto and his close family also prospered, amassing a fortune estimated to be several 
billion dollars (McLeod and MacIntyre 2007). 
 
The 1997 Asian economic crisis devastated the economy and provoked dramatic political change. 
Popular discontent and resentment at the government’s corruption manifested in urban riots and 
Suharto was forced to resign in May 1998. His vice-president, B.J. Habibie was subsequently sworn in 
as president, and in a state of the nation address on 15 August 1998
10
, he suggested that the 
proportion in poverty had soared to 40%
11
. In what became known as the Reformasi era, the regime 
liberalised, political prisoners were released, controls were lifted on the press, independent political 
parties and unions were sanctioned, and political and economic stabilization became the main tasks 
of government. In June 1999, the country held its first free legislative elections and the People’s 
Consultative Assembly (MPR) subsequently selected Abdurrahman Wahid as president, who offered 
the vice-president position to Megawati Sukarnoputri (Sukarno’s second child and first daughter). In 
July 2001, however, Wahid was implicated in two corruption scandals, impeached, and Megawati was 
sworn in as the fifth president. In July 2004, the first direct presidential elections were held and Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (known by his initials SBY) won a clear victory in a second round run off against 
Megawati. 
 
SBY’s administration has set a new tone of competence and political accountability, and has acted 
significantly in the struggle against pervasive corruption, but the economic and political situation is 
widely perceived to be, if not in a state of flux, at least mutable. Dramatic and far-reaching events 
have arisen rapidly and with little warning in the past, and with parliamentary elections scheduled for 
April 2009, and presidential elections for July, the future is looking less predictable than usual, even 
with SBY consistently leading the opinion polls. Economically, the country is more resilient than it has 
ever been, if not growing so dynamically, but exchange rates still wander alarmingly, and rapid 
changes in the prices of raw materials and basic commodities make forward planning difficult for 
                                                     
9
 http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/bangkok/skills-ap/skills/indonesia_literacy.htm accessed 12 
December 2008 
10
 Jakarta Post 16/8/98 and in Bourchier and Hadiz (2003) 
11
 Fabiosa et al (2004) report real per capita income dropping from $1000 in 1996 to $205 in 1998. 
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business and government alike. Politically, the picture is brighter now than ever, but significant 
patches of poverty and extreme contrasts of wealth suggest that it is brighter for some than others, 
and that a dangerous fragility may not be far beneath the surface. Perhaps living on a chain of 
volcanic islands fixes minds on the here and now, rather than tomorrow, or the day after, but this is 
not a mind set well suited to the years or even decades of determined and consistent activity 
required to combat a highly infectious disease entrenched in millions of small animals. The questions 
emerge: How can HPAI be managed in such a setting? Are the existing political processes fit for such 
a purpose? How might they help or hinder the response?  
 
POLITICS AND POLICY MAKING 
 
Indonesia’s system of government is both presidential and parliamentary in style, and has seen 
significant change since the beginning of the Reformasi era. According to the amended 1945 
constitution, the Indonesian president is head of state, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and 
chief executive, responsible for domestic governance, policy-making and foreign affairs. He or she 
appoints a council of ministers to serve as the executive, who need not be elected members of the 
legislature. Two chambers form the legislative branch. The 695-member Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat (MPR), or People’s Consultative Assembly, has the authority to amend the constitution and to 
inaugurate, and discharge, the president and vice-president. It is made up of all 550 members of the 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakya (DPR), or House of Representatives, who are elected for a five-year term by 
proportional representation in multi-member constituencies, plus the members of the Dewan 
Perwakilan Daerah (DPD), or Regional Representatives Council, also selected at general elections. 
Other organs of state include the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung), the Constitutional Court 
(Mahkamah Konstitusi) and the State Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan). 
 
Since 1999, constitutional and institutional reform has led to some important changes including 
direct presidential and parliamentary elections, a far-reaching decentralization programme, two-term 
limits for the president and vice-president, and the creation of the DPD, in which each province is 
represented by four members. These moves have seen the DPR gain considerable power, and it is 
increasingly assertive in its oversight of the executive. Critics, however, express disappointment at the 
slowness of reform, suggesting that the DPR has yet to demonstrate any great capacity to distinguish 
between privately and socially beneficial demands, and remains unresponsive to concerns about the 
business environment (McLeod and MacIntyre 2007). Others suggest that the democratic transition 
has been marked by dramatic breakthroughs followed by disillusionment, and that a high degree of 
continuity exists between the new democratic politics and those of the authoritarian past. Aspinall’s 
(2005) analysis sees Suharto’s government replaced by a reconstituted version of itself, with 
Suharto’s hand-picked vice-president, B.J. Habibie, moving into the presidential palace. His 
successors, presidents Wahid and Megawati also failed to inspire. McGibbon (2006:321) characterises 
the period of 1998 to 2004 as ‘six years of weak government, economic hardship and far-reaching 
political change’. 
 
On Suharto’s demise, one interviewee said: 
 
An entirely family-orientated country lost its father. He was not always the kindest father, but 
everyone looked to him to steer the ship. A vague nation became even vaguer; the ship lost 
its rudder, and forwards movement. Politically things have got better – we have a free press 
for example – but there has been no replacement for that authority. We are fixing a new 
rudder now, and going forwards again, but the rudder is not so big, and not so well connected 
to the helmsman. If Suharto had got the bit of bird flu between his teeth, we would have seen 
a completely different reaction
12
. 
                                                     
12
 Interview, Jakarta 25 August 2008 
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Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s 2004 success in the first ever direct presidential elections saw a new 
optimism, which has been described as ‘a triumph of personality, image and popular choice over 
party machine politics and the power of party bosses’ (Aspinall 2005a cited in McGibbon 2006). SBY, a 
reserved, secular and relatively progressive ex-army general from Java, has been credited with 
forming a successful partnership with the more exuberant vice-president Jusuf Kalla, from South 
Sulawesi. He has fostered democracy, manoeuvred the army out of politics, and given the economy a 
much-needed boost through sound microeconomic policies and structural reforms. Other successes 
have included maintaining a peace agreement with secessionist Aceh province, on the country’s 
northern tip, and addressing the issue of deep-rooted corruption. More nuanced comment, however, 
suggests that the defining feature of SBY’s presidency has been a strong tendency to engage in 
political compromise, and to prefer stability over unsettling political and economic change 
(McGibbon 2006). One example given is the government’s reluctance to confront growing religious 
intolerance (McLeod 2008:183). This paper suggests that another, in the face of a significant number 
of competing priorities, has been an unwillingness to engage with both the business interests 
associated with the integrated poultry industry, and the 30 million or so households which keep 
poultry at home.  
 
One reason for this inability to defend and push through difficult decisions is that, compared with the 
two previous presidents, SBY does not have a natural constituency. If Wahid’s ideology was founded 
in traditional Islam, and Megawati’s in secular nationalism, SBY’s touchstone might best be described 
as pragmatic populism, with vacillation or back-tracking common in the face of any opposition. 
Another factor fomenting against change is the fragmented multi-party political system. Under 
Suharto, only three officially sanctioned and tightly controlled ‘national’ parties were allowed. The 
liberalisations of 1998 saw over 100 new parties emerge in months (Reilly 2007), and only a complex 
set of incentives and restraints limited numbers to 48 in the 1999 national elections, and 24 in the 
2004 elections. Haggard (1997 cited in Reilly 2007) points to the difficulties of such systems in which 
parties may only need a small plurality of votes to win office, and so can focus on providing benefits 
to their own supporters. This compares with systems involving smaller numbers of parties, where 
support must be cultivated and maintained across a broader range of social groups. This may cause 
particular problems in diverse societies like Indonesia where parties often form around distinct social 
groups based on ethnic, religious or regional identities. A further, and related, factor supporting the 
status quo is the practical complexity of political life in ‘rainbow’ cabinets, where posts and state 
resources may need to be distributed to neutralise party opposition.  
 
Indonesia is accustomed to strong and decisive leadership. In Max Weber’s terms, Sukarno’s 
presidency (1945 – 1967) was arguably based on ‘charismatic’ authority, and Suharto’s (1967 – 1998) 
on ‘patrimonial’ authority. Only in the last ten years has the country made moves towards a European 
(Ancient Greek) idea of democracy, with SBY, the current president, facing the challenges of coaxing 
politics towards the base of a ‘legal’ authority, founded on modern concepts of the law, the state and 
bureaucracy. Traditional Javanese political processes such as musyawarah (discussion, deliberation, 
consultation) are still very much in play, and powerful mythological ideas such as that of the satria 
(knight) – the smooth and unruffled man of power who exerts himself as little as possible in any 
action – are far from irrelevant. Finer grain analyses of Javanese concepts of power (cf. Anderson 
2006) see manifestations of disorder in the natural world, such as floods, eruptions and plagues, as 
symptoms (but not causes) of a lessening of a ruler’s power. The implications for the response to 
HPAI are manifold. First, a base political instinct must suggest ignoring HPAI, or at least not 
acknowledging it as a substantial problem. Secondly, the protocols of power (as well as the 
associated, essential good manners) prohibit any sort of display of agitation, or real determination for 
the future to have a particular shape. Thirdly, as the next section outlines, the control room of political 
order is still under construction. 
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A BIG BANG 
 
The World Bank (2003:1) calls Indonesia's 1999 decentralization legislation (Law No. 22/1999 on 
Governance – revised by Law No. 32/2004 – and Law No. 25/1999 on Financial Balance between the 
Central and Local Governments), implementation of which began on 1 January 2001, a ‘Big Bang’. One 
of the most centralized countries in the world was being transformed into one of the most 
decentralized. This was a key element in the reform strategy of the IMF, proposed in 1998, and widely 
considered essential to resolve the regional and ethnic tensions that resulted from Java’s historical 
hegemony and the policies of Suharto’s ‘New Order’. During that period, strict control was exercised 
to the benefit of the centre through the security apparatus, corporatist controls, and co-optation of 
the legislature. Public services for the entire country were implemented through a long, hierarchical 
apparatus that was designed not to meet the needs of the people, but to accord with the strategic 
interests of central actors and their cronies (Erawan 2007). 
 
Change came in three areas: a direct electoral system, introduced in 2004, made the governors, 
district heads and mayors representatives of their constituents rather than appointees of central 
government; local governments were guaranteed authority and discretion in policy innovation, with 
funding mechanisms put in place to enable regions to fulfil their autonomous functions; and the 
bureaucracy was restructured to emphasise local delivery. Most significantly, power was not devolved 
to the provinces, which might only have exacerbated centripetal forces, but to the districts and the 
municipalities. Consequently, in January 2007, Indonesia comprised 33 provinces and 456 
autonomous local governments of which 363 were districts (regencies) and 93 municipalities (cities) 
(McLeod 2008:201-202). 
 
The responsibility for controlling HPAI falls largely on the autonomous district-level governments, 
and national guidelines are only implemented when local officials think it is necessary and have the 
funds and local support to do so. Many interviewees suggested that this was the most significant 
challenge to controlling the disease in the country. One respondent was explicit: “Decentralization is 
why avian influenza became established here, why it spread so rapidly, and why there is still no 
effective response”13. Another said: 
 
In terms of dealing with an animal disease decentralization is a disaster. To pass responsibility 
to 440-plus autonomous administrations is absolutely ridiculous. The Ministry of Agriculture 
can do and say what it wants, but the districts don’t have to take any notice, and nearly always 
don’t. I guess their attitude is that there is no point to otonomi unless you are autonomous14. 
 
An informant from an international organization responsible for implementation said: 
 
What otonomi means is that we have to negotiate with every district. Before we can start 
operating we have to get buy in from the local leaders and decision makers. We have to 
persuade them. Then we have to convince the local animal health people it’s a good thing. 
And only then can we start doing the real work. It is a long and challenging set of steps
15
. 
 
The story in the health sector is the same. Padmawati and Nichter (2008:44) quote a WHO 
epidemiologist in Jakarta, interviewed by Associated Press: 
 
The amount of decentralization here is breathtaking. Health Ministry officials often meet with 
outside experts to formulate plans to fight bird flu, but they are rarely implemented. Their 
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power extends to the walls of their office. The advice must reach nearly 450 districts, where 
local officials then decide whether to take action. 
 
Otonomi was however not just a political ideology and a reaction to inefficient and corrupt central 
bureaucrats, but also a means to reduce central government expenditure, with local governments 
raising taxes from their own natural resources and business activities. In particular, veterinary services 
became an ‘easy target’ for cost cutting (Normile 2007:31). As one source16 put it: 
 
At the provincial level we can find the Livestock Service, but in the district level we cannot 
always find the Livestock Service since sometimes the Livestock Service is under another 
Service supervision, such as Agriculture and Marine Service. The Livestock service is 
positioned as sub-service [and beyond this, Animal Health is a further sub-service of the 
Livestock service]. This causes trouble in receiving and applying commands from the centre 
to eradicate AI, and is also sensitively related to the budget issues. 
 
Furthermore, the central state has no mandate to audit local governments, and district authorities 
are not obliged to report accounts. Examining the health sector in four districts (Central Java, 
Lombok, Kalimantan and Flores), Kristiansen and Santoso (2006:254) found no figures available for 
the real district government expenditure and concluded that ‘there is a total lack of financial 
transparency and accountability in all districts’. 
 
As might be expected – or even hoped – the results of decentralization are far from uniform. One 
significant factor is that income per capita is more than 50 times higher in the richest districts 
compared with the poorest, mainly due to earnings from oil and gas resources. Erawan (2007) reports 
significant variations in the style of politics across the country, with local state capture and rampant 
corruption in some jurisdictions, and deepening democracy and the emergence of effective 
government in others. Hadiz and Robison (2005:234-235) suggest that there are powerful interests 
intent on maintaining the status quo, reporting on the rise of gangsters (preman) in North Sumatra, 
Yogyakarta and East Java in ‘a replication ad infinitum of the predatory pattern of state-business 
relations, which under New Order rule was concentrated in Jakarta, but is now growing more or less 
autonomously at the local level’. Other analyses are more positive. Concerning elections to the JPPR, 
covering 224 regions, McGibbon (2006:331-2) found that over 40% of incumbents lost office, that 
elections introduced an element of downward accountability, and that elected executives were being 
forced to take account of citizens’ demands as never before. 
 
Similarly there are variations in the HPAI response and some “pockets of excellence”17. Lampung in 
Sumatra is often given as an example, and regions in Kalimantan, which have only had sporadic 
outbreaks, are also deemed to have had some successes
18
. Similarly, Bali has been well co-ordinated 
since mid-2006, and South Sulawesi is often cited as a bright spot: “The governor is engaged, there 
are some proper movement controls, and they are doing sensible things like paying compensation 
[for culling] and worrying about reclaiming the funds afterwards”19. One interviewee suggested taking 
advantage of this: “If we could bypass the complex politics at the top, and reward regions that were 
responding well, the others might get the message and we could see a different picture emerging”20.  
 
The bottom line, however, is that decentralization, especially in its highly variegated and in many 
senses admirable Indonesian form, conspires against almost every principle of stamping out an 
infectious animal disease. This requires comprehensive, consistent and co-ordinated action across 
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the whole infected area. But with priorities, competencies, funding and even administrative cultures 
and languages varying across 450-plus autonomous regions, some of which are prepared to 
collaborate with their neighbours – and the centre – and others less so, the consequences for the 
HPAI response are stark. Devising and implementing a national response consistent with the 
modernist command and control principles of the international guidelines is an uphill task. In theory, 
legislation solves the problem, but as the following section explains, this corner of the control room is 
in particular disarray. 
 
LEGISLATION AND THE RULE OF LAW 
 
Indonesia’s legislation relating to animal health dates from 1967 (Law No. 6 on Animal Husbandry and 
Veterinary Hygiene) and does not cover an outbreak situation. According to one informant, the 
government does not actually have the legal capability to cull infected poultry
21
. A revision 
(provisionally entitled the 2008 Law on Animal Husbandry and Animal Health) has been in draft for 
over a year, but still has serious flaws. Critics find over 20 shortcomings including: lack of clarity in to 
whom or to what the Law applies, lack of specificity in defining which diseases are notifiable and what 
the responsibilities of the veterinary authority are, and an inadequate definition of epidemic diseases 
of livestock
22
. Decentralization, of course, complicates matters further. As an interviewee put it: 
“Neither the national government nor the regions have the capacity to address the gaps in the animal 
health laws. They don’t have the skills, they don’t have the focus, they don’t see it as a priority”23. 
 
The situation is further complicated by politics. An informant offered one explanation: “The 
agriculture minister does not have the necessary influence at the high table. This should have the 
highest priority. What can you do if there is no law?”24 Another suggested: 
 
[Minister] Apriyantono’s appointment was seen as sop to the Islamicists. He’s not particularly 
respected. He spends his time building networks with places like Sudan, which doesn’t do 
much for Indonesia. But to be fair to him he has a complex constituency – smallholders, 
middle holders, the big food producers – and I don’t think anybody would envy his job in the 
bird flu response: trying to change the national way of life. Bakrie, the co-ordinating minister, 
is respected, and could get a lot done. People try to pull him in, but he tends to body swerve, 
and it’s hard to blame him. What do you do except make yourself unpopular? And he has 
plenty else to do. If you look at all the other issues, avian influenza is just a little rattle deep in 
the Indonesian machine. It’s not really part of the national debate. No one takes it seriously25. 
 
Within the agriculture department itself, matters are no less complex with the Directorate of Animal 
Health subordinate to the Directorate General of Livestock Services, and numerically and politically 
outnumbered by it. A respondent said: 
 
There is actually no permanent CVO [Chief Veterinary Officer] at the moment. Who knows 
what’s really going on, but to my best knowledge the previous CVO, Musni [Suatmodjo], was 
caught up in a scandal, and the director before that didn’t last long. Running Indonesia’s 
animal health service is beginning to look like a poisoned chalice
26
. 
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Even if appropriate regulations existed, enforcement would still be problematic
27
. Despite a 
determined anti-corruption drive, and indeed the SBY’s reputation as ‘Mr Clean’, Indonesia was 
ranked 143 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 
2007. Under Suharto, the judiciary was effectively an instrument of the regime and some suggest 
that, consistent with the politics of compromise, the recent high-profile investigations and 
prosecutions have failed to reach the entrenched interests at the centre of power (McGibbon 
2006:325). Others go further claiming that reformasi era corruption is actually more damaging 
because it is fragmented, incoherent and not under the control of a central force (McLeod and 
MacIntyre 2007:3). Hadiz and Robison (2005:237-8) conclude: 
 
This regulatory state, like all modes of organising power, requires a social and political base 
which as yet does not exist in Indonesia… In the present conjuncture, save for isolated 
pockets of liberals in a few government ministries and agencies, and some academics and 
intellectuals, the building blocks for such a vehicle are virtually nowhere to be found. 
 
Consequently, the rationalist, science-led approach of the tried and tested international response to 
infectious animal disease, which assumes a Weberian bureaucracy operating in the context of a 
liberal democracy, runs aground on Indonesia’s complex democracy in formation. One question that 
arises is: is Indonesia likely to attain this state, and if so when? Another, given that there is no reason 
why the country should follow Europe’s political evolution, and certainly no reason why it should be 
pressurised to do so, is whether the international response to HPAI needs to be modified to take 
account of the specific local context. Imposing standard rational-technocratic policy solutions on 
contexts they don’t fit is frustrating, and may be counter productive. Accepting that such responses 
may usefully bear modification opens up fresh perspectives on understanding what is not possible, or 
worthwhile, and more importantly, what is. The following section looks at what happened when the 
H5N1 virus first appeared in the country. 
 
THE ARRIVAL OF HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA 
 
HPAI first appeared in Pekalongan in Central Java in August 2003 and by January 2004 it had spread 
across Java and into Bali, Kalimantan and southern Sumatra
28
. In 2005, it reached Sulawesi, North 
Sumatra, and Aceh, and in 2006, Papua. At the end of June 2006, 27 of 33 provinces were affected 
(Sedyaningsih et al 2007:522) and at mid-2008, all but two – North Maluku and Gorontalo – had 
reported outbreaks. In March 2008, the FAO described the avian influenza situation in Indonesia as 
‘critical’, quoting FAO Chief Veterinary Officer Joseph Domenech: ‘Despite major control efforts, the 
country has not succeeded in containing the spread of avian influenza in poultry’29, and in September 
(FAO 2008:49) the official verdict was that ‘the disease remains endemic in Java, Sumatra, Bali and 
South Sulawesi, with sporadic outbreaks reported from other areas’. Reports from the field in 
December 2008 paint a more positive picture: 
 
Control has been achieved in some areas, such as Kalimantan, and Ministry of Agriculture 
data appear to show that the disease is no longer spreading to new areas, that overall 
incidence and geographic spread is decreasing, and that selected areas, such as Bali, have 
seen large reductions in disease incidence. It is true though, that despite this progress in 
reducing the level and extent of virus circulation, the disease is not yet under control in 
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densely populated areas, such as western and Central Java, and there is a need for continued 
effort
30
. 
 
 
Location of Human H5N1 Avian Influenza Cases and Animal Outbreaks at 10 December 2008
31
 
 
Initial outbreaks are thought to have been in the commercial poultry sector, resulting from imports of 
live birds as breeding stock from China (Sedyaningsih et al 2007:522, Vanzetti 2007:2-3). Thailand has 
also been suggested as the immediate source of infected birds
32
. Others close to the matter say it is 
essentially unknown in which sector the disease first appeared, and where it came from. One 
informant said: “The rumours say it was industry first, but that is all there is to go on. Rumour and 
hearsay”33. Phylogenetic analysis suggests that the Indonesian outbreak originated from a single 
introduction (Smith et al 2006). The rapid spread is most commonly explained as a result of the 
movement of infected commodities including commercial chickens (Thornton 2007). The 
Indonesian government declared HPAI infection to the OIE in January 2004 and on 3 February 2004, 
the Minister of Agriculture issued decree no: 96/Kpts/PD.620/2/2004, declaring avian influenza a 
dangerous disease. 
 
Between August 2003 and January 2004, at least 600,000 chickens reportedly died of the disease in 
17 of Central Java’s 35 regencies
34
. Some 10.5 million birds were reportedly lost in 2004 due to 
disease and culling
35
, and during peaks of infection in February/March 2005 and 2006, recorded 
monthly poultry deaths were 530,453 and 647,832 respectively
36
 with losses due to disease or 
culling estimated to be between 15% and 20% of all poultry stock. In 2004, the combined effect of 
50% to 60% lower prices and 40% lower sales volumes meant income reductions of 70% to 80% for 
traders, and employment opportunities dropped by 40% on larger poultry farms
37
. According to the 
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chairman of the Indonesian Poultry Breeders Association, 2.5 million workers in an industry with an 
annual turnover of Rp50 trillion (US$5.95 billion) were affected
38
. 
 
Many groups, including the press
39
, were quick to cry foul. The Chinese government had set a 
precedent for opacity in their early cover up of the 2002-2003 SARS outbreak, and the Indonesian 
government had doubtlessly been pushed to make an announcement. Confirmation of millions of 
HPAI deaths by the East Java chapter of the Indonesian Association of Veterinarians was significant, as 
was the Malaysian and Singaporean governments’ ban on poultry imports from Indonesia40. At a press 
conference, however, the then Director General for the Development of Animal Husbandry, Sofjan 
Sudardjat, denied allegations that the announcement had been delayed due to pressure from the 
poultry industry, and suggested that the disease had been intentionally introduced into Indonesia by 
foreign parties. Industry was unsympathetic. ‘The government is slow in handling the problem and is 
giving opportunities for the virus to spread to other areas in the archipelago. We have been asking for 
the vaccine since September,’ was the response of the Indonesian Poultry Breeders Association 41. 
 
A number of vivid conspiracy stories (see Box 1) surround the first months of infection, but those 
close to the matter have a more consistent and prosaic set of explanations. One respondent 
suggested: 
 
First there was the matter of not believing it was HPAI. Chickens die of disease regularly
42
 and 
with no AI reported in the country, there was no reason to think of it as an AI outbreak. 
Secondly there was no idea what to do. There were no reagents stored for testing, and with 
no scientific proof, it was easy for the Newcastle
43
 lobby to influence the decision makers
44
. 
 
Another said: 
 
It was a cock-up rather than a conspiracy; bureaucratic inertia and incompetence rather than 
anything deliberate. The civil service here is very formalised, very hierarchical. You have to be 
deferential. If there was some technician with a test that was showing positive, he or she 
probably didn’t show it to their boss for fear of upsetting them. It’s possible too that the 
technical people, or even the regional bosses, were not aware of the need to report, or how to 
do it. Doing nothing is always the best course
45
. 
 
 
 
 
Box 1 - Rumours and conspiracy stories 
 
A cloud of rumour and some vivid conspiracy stories have emerged around the uncertain 
knowledge associated with the arrival of HPAI. Reflecting nationalist concerns, one of the most 
common is that the US introduced the virus to destroy the Indonesian poultry industry and 
promote its own poultry exports and vaccines. Similar stories make China the protagonist, again 
looking to boost exports, with the government complicit as they would collect higher import taxes. 
More strategic analyses suggest that it was introduced by the US as part of a global plot to 
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destabilise Islamic countries; or more specifically to weaken Indonesia, to make it more 
dependent on international aid and loans, and therefore behoven to the western powers in need 
of its natural resources
1
. Evidence given in support of this view is the fact that the disease arrived 
later in the predominantly Christian provinces
2
. Domestic plots suggest that avian influenza was 
introduced by big business in league with central government to drive small producers out of the 
market by depressing prices and making factory-raised chickens appear safer
3
. Others, including 
some poultry farmers, hold that the government is exaggerating the problem in order to attract 
donor funds. Many are of the opinion that avian flu is being sensationalised by the press to sell 
papers
4
. 
 
1
 Interviews, Jakarta 14 August 2008 
2
 See: http://www.indonesiamatters.com/1042/bird-flu/#comment-13469 (accessed 1 November 2008) 
3
 Padmawati and Nichter 2008:42 
4
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Once the news reached Jakarta, other factors came into play. As one interviewee explained: 
 
Ministers travel all the time. They are expected to and whilst they are away nothing gets 
delegated, nothing gets decided. Whenever it was that some brave soul had summoned up 
the courage to go to the boss and say ‘we have a problem’ there was a 50/50 chance the 
boss was away and nobody wanted to know
46
. 
 
Another suggested: 
 
We don’t know exactly what happened. The opinion is that it started in the integrated sector 
but the backyard farmers got blamed. They are a more visible target and have no way of 
putting their case in an organized way. It’s easy to argue that poor and uneducated people 
are the source of the disease rather than big business. It might be the case that the industry 
simply does not want to ‘fess up, but it is more likely that they see it as their business and 
their business alone. If they went to the government, would anybody say thank you to them? 
Would they get any help? No. They’d be told it’s their problem, go sort it out, leave us alone, 
we have more important things to think about
47
. 
 
And the fact is that in 2004, as the virus was spreading rapidly across the most populated areas of the 
country, the people and the politicians did have other priorities. In June that year, the country had its 
first ever, and exuberant, free presidential election with a 70% turn out. In September a terrorist 
bomb in Jakarta killed nine people, and injured over 100. And on 26 December, the Indian Ocean 
tsunami hit. As one informant put it: “After the tsunami, everything else dropped off the radar. This 
was understandable”48. 
 
A time line follows setting the significant reported events of the HPAI outbreak, and the subsequent 
response, against other newsworthy events. One intention is to make clear the scale and frequency 
of the other deadly and life-threatening occurrences that occupy the media, interest the population, 
and demand the politicians’ attention. The human death toll from avian influenza – 113 confirmed to 
date – for example, slips towards insignificance when compared with the death tolls from other 
diseases, and all manner of other natural and man-made disasters. Secondly, the escalating nature of 
the HPAI epidemic, and the increasing scale and scope of the response, become evident.  
Timeline – Avian influenza & other events 2004 – 2008 
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Avian Influenza  Other Events and H5N1 Human Deaths 
 2004  
24/1 Singapore and Malaysia postpone 
poultry import plans following thousands 
of chicken deaths in East Java and Bali. 
26/1 Ministry of Agriculture admits the 
disease was first spotted in August 2003 
in Pekalongan, Central Java, before 
spreading to other areas. 
29/1 Jakarta chicken sales drop 50%. 
30/1 Pressure from WHO. Selective cull of 
infected chickens announced. 
2/2 Government allocates Rp50 billion 
($5.9 million) for compensation and 
orders the vaccination of healthy 
chickens. Vaccines to be imported.  
5/2 Government announces outbreaks in 
51 regencies in 10 provinces across the 
country with 4.7 million chickens killed to 
date at a cost to industry of Rp7.7 trillion 
($911 million). 
6/2 First cull: Tabanan regency on Bali. 
7/2 Worries over uncertified vaccines 
from China reported. 
Q1 5/2 Earthquake in Papua kills 23. 
19/2 Dengue fever outbreak has killed 91 
people to date. 
 Q2 5/4 Parliamentary and local elections. 
11/4 58,301 dengue fever and DHF cases 
with 658 deaths reported in 2004. 
19/6 Officials burn avian influenza 
vaccine smuggled from China. 
3/7 Thailand bans poultry from Vietnam 
and Indonesia. 
16/7 7.4 million chickens, ducks, geese, 
pigeons and other birds are estimated to 
have died from the disease. 
Q3 5/7 First-ever direct presidential elections: 
former general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
and incumbent Megawati Sukarnoputri clear 
front runners. 
6/9 Car bomb outside the Australian 
embassy in Jakarta kills nine people and 
injures over 100.  
20/9 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono wins 61% 
of the vote in the runoff round of the 
presidential election. 
4/10 HPAI in Grobogan regency, Central 
Java. Breeders receive 300,000 free doses 
of vaccine. 
13/12 HPAI breaks out in several parts of 
West Nusa Tenggara. Local officials say 
that more than 20,000 birds, or 43% of 
the poultry population in the city have 
died. 
Q4 20/10 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono sworn in 
as president. 
26/12 More than 200,000 Indonesians are 
dead or missing following the Indian Ocean 
tsunami. 
 2005  
4/3 HPAI spreads to West Java with 
Cirebon municipality having the largest 
number of reported cases. In 2004, more 
than 10 areas in the province were 
affected: 1.6 million, or 25% of chickens 
died. 
Q1 28/3 8.7M earthquake off Sumatra kills at 
least 1,000 people, many of them on Nias 
island. 
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24/3 HPAI continues to spread in South 
Sulawesi, affecting around 128,000 
chickens in four regencies. Government 
sets aside Rp750 million ($83,333) to 
assist poultry breeders. 
30/3 Over 23 million doses of bird flu 
vaccine prepared to prevent spread in 
Central Java. 
 Q2 June Launch of direct elections for local 
governments. 
8/6 Eight new polio cases confirmed 
bringing total to 28. 
25/7 Director General for Animal 
Husbandry announces that the Ministry 
had distributed 126 million doses of 
vaccine. 
25/7 Cull in Tangerang sees only 31 pigs 
and 40 ducks destroyed due to lack of 
compensation money. 
8/8 Demand for chicken and eggs 
increases driven largely by restaurants and 
supermarkets. 
Q3 21/7 First laboratory confirmed H5N1 
human death announced. 
25/7 Government designates 44 specialist 
influenza hospitals across the country. 
15/8 Government and Free Aceh 
Movement separatists sign a peace deal. 
5/9 Passenger aircraft crash in Medan kills 
more than 150. 
1/9 ‘Tanggap Flu Burung’ public 
awareness campaign launched. 
Government declares “an extraordinary 
event”. 
21/9 Ragunan Zoo in South Jakarta is 
closed: 19 of its captive birds had avian 
influenza. 
5/10 Indonesia currently has 25,000 
boxes of Tamiflu available.  
8/10 Ministry of Agriculture allegedly 
complicit with vaccine producers in 
lowering quality in order to gain more 
profit from the contract value. Also 
alleged corruption in the disbursement of 
compensation funds for poultry farmers. 
12/10 Ragunan Zoo re-opens. 
9/11 Latest data from the ministry shows 
that as many as 16.2 million birds have 
been killed due to the virus, which has 
spread to 22 of 33 provinces. 
24/11 Infected birds have been found in 
seven of 20 subdistricts in Jakarta. 
2/12 Avian influenza detected in Aceh. 
Q4 16/9 Second laboratory confirmed H5N1 
human death announced. 
1/10 Three suicide bombings on Bali kill 20 
people. (This followed an attack in October 
2002 which killed 202.) 
1/10 Fuel prices double. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2006  
27/2 Door-to-door checks and 
vaccination in Jakarta after two residents 
die in January. 
7/3 KOMNAS FBPI created. 
17/3 Government appoints state 
pharmaceutical company Indofarma to 
supply 12 million Osletamivir tablets. 
Q1 6/2 Four further human cases announced. 
29/3 Annual death toll of 140,000 from 
chronic TB announced. Indonesia third 
behind China and India in TB prevalence. 
10/3 28 confirmed human cases to date of 
which 21 were fatal. 
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24/3 Jakarta residents asked to keep their 
birds in cages. 
1/4 Participatory Disease Surveillance 
programme covers 12 districts in Java. 
11/4 Vaccine shortage hampers 
government's nationwide poultry 
vaccination drive. 
21-23/6 Government, WHO, FAO and 
UNICEF expert meeting. 
 
Q2 18-23/5 Six family members die in Karo 
Regency, North Sumatra. Health authorities 
ask 30 people to quarantine themselves. 
27/5 6.3M earthquake kills c. 6,000 people 
near Yogyakarta in central Java, $3.1b loss 
and damage estimated. 
28/5 Mudflow in Sidoarjo, East Java, 
displaces more than 10,000 people. 
15/9 Bogor begins mass vaccination. 
20/9 North Sumatra Animal Husbandry 
Office says five regions in the province are 
still experiencing worrying levels of poultry 
deaths. 
Q3 17/7 7.7M undersea earthquake off Java 
kills more than 500 people. 
2/12 Rp1.1 trillion ($1.2 million) losses 
due to avian influenza announced. 
Q4 20/11 President Yudhoyono meets with 
President Bush in Bogor. 
29/12 Ferry sinks in Java Sea. At least 461 
killed. 
 2007  
17/1 Jakarta governor Sutiyoso bans 
backyard birds. 50% drop in chicken sales 
reported in Jakarta. 
22/1 Thousands of birds culled in Jakarta. 
Poultry health certification scheme 
announced; breeding, storage, 
slaughtering facilities to be moved. 
25/1 Mass culling blamed for rising prices 
in Yogyakarta. 
2/2 Jakarta inspections called off due to 
torrential rain. 100,000+ ‘infected’ poultry 
culled to date. 
8/2 Government appoints Swiss-based 
Baxter Healthcare SA to develop a human 
vaccine for the Indonesian strain of bird 
flu. 
16/2 WHO officials meet health minister 
Siti Fadillah Supari. Indonesia insists on a 
material transfer agreement. 
29/3 Health ministers from 18 Asia-
Pacific countries issue the ‘Jakarta 
Declaration’, calling for “more open virus 
and information sharing and accessibility 
to avian influenza and other potential 
pandemic influenza vaccines for 
developing countries”. 
Q1 1/1 Passenger aircraft crash off Sulawesi 
kills all 102 onboard. 
8/2 Floods in Jakarta kill more than 20 and 
leave hundreds of thousands homeless. 
7/3 Passenger aircraft crash at Yogyakarta 
kills 22. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7/4 West Java decrees that all poultry 
must be kept at least 2.5 metres from all 
houses in areas that receive direct 
sunlight. 
14/4 60th World Health Assembly, 
Geneva. 
30/5 The Ministry of Agriculture 
Q2 16/4 WHO confirms 15 additional cases, 
including 13 deaths. Total is now 96 
confirmed cases with 76 deaths. 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
announces the purchase of 60 million 
doses of vaccine, and grants of 33 million 
doses, from China and 5 million from the 
World Bank. 
15/6 New animal health law proposed to 
replace the existing 1967 law. 
27/8 Jembrana Regency, Bali lifts its ban 
on chicken meat and day-old chicks from 
entering the regency following protests 
from Bali poultry farmers. 
11/9 International avian influenza 
conference on Bali. 
Q3 11/7 European Union bans Indonesia's 
national air carrier, Garuda, and 66 other 
airlines from EU air space.  
23/8 First death on Bali reported. 
20/11 Follow-up to May 2007 World 
Health Assembly meeting. 
Q4  
 2008  
4/2 An announcement of infections in 
chickens causes panic among residents in 
Banjarnegara regency Central Java. 
22/2 Indonesia sent two virus samples to 
WHO after receiving assurances its rights 
to any vaccines produced from them 
would be recognized. 
25/3 Jakarta administration and KOMNAS 
announce intensification of prevention 
and control programme. 
Q1 27/1 Former President Suharto dies. 
30/1 Three more deaths. Jakarta has been 
hardest hit by bird flu, with 29 reported 
cases and 25 deaths. 
 
 
 
28/4 US NAMRU 2 laboratory in Jakarta 
accused of engaging in intelligence 
operations. 
20/6 Health Minister decides to withhold 
information on human deaths. 
Q2 26/4 Pandemic exercise on Bali. 
23/5 Fuel prices increased by 29% on 
average with subsidies to 19.1 million poor 
families. 
 Q4 9/12 Total 139 confirmed cases to date 
with 113 deaths. 
 
Sources: BBC Online (www.bbc.co.uk), Jakarta Post (www.thejakartapost.com) Sejarah Indonesia 
(www.gimonca.com/sejarah/sejarah.shtml), Indonesian Embassy, Washington DC 
(http://www.embassyofindonesia.org/news/newsarchives.htm), Wikipedia (http://www.wikipedia.org), WHO 
(http://www.who.or.id/avian/current_situation.php)  
 
The selection of items for inclusion in this time line is from an extensive catalogue and to a degree 
opportunistic. Some caution is therefore appropriate in any analysis. However, a number of salient 
points can be drawn from it. First is the apparently reactive nature of nearly all of the government’s 
announcements and actions, and there is little evidence of any determination at the highest levels to 
drive policies through, once formed. Secondly, whilst there is doubtlessly a media bias towards the 
capital, Jakarta, it appears to be there that policy is most rigorously implemented. An interviewee 
supported this view: “The capital is what the president sees, where he lives, and where he drives 
about. If he doesn’t see any chickens on the streets, and if there are no deaths in the city, his interest 
level is not going to be that high”49. Thirdly, HPAI doubtlessly has had a significant impact right 
through the food supply chain. Although the disease is not transmitted to humans through properly 
cooked meat or eggs, consumers are quick to abandon poultry products when an outbreak is 
announced, and almost as quick to return to them when the fuss dies down. Fourthly, there is a 
continuing and detailed discourse relating to poultry vaccine, both as a solution and a problem. This is 
probably related to the perception of vaccine as a panacea, to the significant business interests 
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associated with providing vaccine on such a large scale, and to nationalistic complexities associated 
with the provision of a supply domestically, compared with importing it from countries such as China. 
Finally, the minister of health’s role in challenging the international status quo with respect to sharing 
human virus samples gains increasing attention. 
 
Against the background of these relatively high profile reported events, a more complex set of actors, 
networks and narratives has emerged as involved with the HPAI epidemic, and the response. These 
are outlined in the following sections. 
 
ACTORS, NETWORKS AND NARRATIVES 
 
Some 30 million homes, 60% of all Indonesian households, are estimated to keep around 300 million 
chickens (ayam kampung) and/or ducks (bebek) and quail (burung puyu) in their backyards (Normile 
2007:31). Wild fowl were probably first domesticated in South East Asia, and foraging chickens are a 
common way for poor people to earn additional income and secure food. Backyard poultry also act as 
a form of capital, which can be sold to pay for items such as school uniforms and medical bills 
(Padmawati and Nichter 2008). Ayam kampung eggs and meat are considered superior to that of 
commercial broiler chicken (ayam potongan, ayam daging) and the meat has about twice the market 
value: $3 per kilogram compared with $1.50 (ibid). Beyond money and food, many Indonesians – 
particularly the Javanese, the Sundanese and the Balinese – have a strong affection for poultry and 
other birds. Poultry hobbyists, pigeon-racers, and song-bird and fighting-cock owners abound, 
together with live bird markets. On Bali, chicken and ducks play important roles in religious 
ceremonies, which occur frequently. A cultural concept exists for the way that birds are kept that is 
not captured by either the ‘pet’ or ‘livestock’ concepts of the West. One respondent stressed that they 
were not pets: “They don’t have names and usually end up in the pot”50. Others spoke of a sense of 
“completeness” they add to a household: 
 
Indonesians, especially those from Java, love to hear the rooster crowing in the morning. 
Negative images are simply not understood because chickens have been a part of life for as 
long as everyone can remember. As well as food and money, they are pride, prestige, even 
toys
51
. 
 
Whilst this picture holds true for much of Java, with just over half the population, the same cannot be 
confidently said of the rest of the country, which is ethnically and culturally diverse. The majority of 
the population are descended from Austronesian-speaking peoples (originally from Taiwan), but 
Melanesians dominate in the eastern parts, and Indian, Arabic, Chinese, Malay, and European genes 
and cultural influences have washed through many parts of the archipelago for centuries
52
. Other 
areas have been, and remain, totally isolated. In all, more than 300 ethnic groups speak over 700 
languages and dialects, and in terms of religion, Moslems, Hindus, Buddhists, animists and a wide 
range of syncretic combinations co-exist
53
. This poses a further set of challenges to a uniform and 
consistent response to HPAI. Attitudes towards birds and poultry, as well as to disease, responsibility, 
authority, and practically every aspect of life and the world, are all culturally located and highly 
variable. 
 
The commercial poultry (ayam negeri) sector is large and well organized, employing over one million 
people (Padmawati and Nichter 2008:32). Historically, production rose at an average rate of 15% per 
annum from 1989 to the start of the economic crisis in 1997, and post crisis the growth trend 
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recommenced
54
. The industry is strongly concentrated in Java and the largest companies are very 
profitable
55. In the government’s first Five Year Plan (1969-74) high priority was given to increasing 
poultry production as a means to provide protein for an increasing population, and in the early 1980s, 
the government passed a decree that regulated the size of commercial laying farms to 5,000 birds. 
One objective was to spread business and employment opportunities; another was to limit the spread 
of disease in poorly managed large-scale poultry units (Kristiansen 2007). The policy was very 
successful. Indonesia now produces more poultry on less land to feed more people than any other 
place on earth
56
. As part of general deregulation of the economy, government support was largely 
abandoned in the late 1980s, and much of the growth since then has occurred through vertically 
integrated production units controlled by a limited number of large-scale feed manufacturers. 
Arguments for this approach have included easier access to veterinary and technical services (Ritter 
1984). The industry has grown rapidly because of increasing domestic demand, a ban on imports of 
poultry parts and strict inspection and ‘halal’ certification requirements (Fabiosa et al 2004). 
Protection for the rice industry is also supported by all major political parties (Fane and Warr 2007). 
 
Encouraging domestic production and promoting rural employment has resulted in the need to 
import feed and other inputs (Fabiosa et al 2004). From a low base in the 1980s, imports of soybeans 
and corn quadrupled with the expansion of the poultry industry between 1991 and 1996. Now 
Indonesia imports over one million tons a year of each of the major feed ingredients, and roughly 
80% of imported corn is used for the production of poultry feed (ibid:1). In 2000, imports came 
mostly from the US (83.8% market share), Brazil and Thailand (8% each). Feed costs in Indonesia are 
consequently higher than elsewhere. Typically in Europe or the US, feed comprises 60-70% of the 
costs of layer egg production. In Indonesia this ratio is usually above 90% (Kristiansen 2007:60). 
 
The ‘big five’ integrators are PT. Charoen Pokphand Indonesia, PT. Japfa Comfeed, PT. Wonokoyo 
Rojokoyo, PT. Sierad Produce
57
, and PT. Leong Hup [Leong Hup Holdings Bhd.] (ibid). Sumiarto and 
Arifin (2008:10) suggest the first three of these companies have shares of total production equivalent 
to 27%, 23%, and 19% respectively. Fabioso (2005) adds PT. Manggis, PT. Cipendawa Agroindustri, 
and PT. Cibadak Indah Sari Farm as large producers. PT. Cheil Jedang, a Korean company located in 
Indonesia, and PT. Galur Palasari Cobbindo are also significant players. The leading companies are 
parts of complex business conglomerates. Kristiansen (2007:60) suggests that elements are owned 
by ethnic Chinese Indonesians with close connections to the family of the former president. Aside 
from poultry farming and feed production and distribution, other activities in these conglomerates 
include poultry shops (providing feed, equipment and drugs), egg distribution, butcher shops and 
fast-food restaurants. Most breeds for chicken egg production in Java and Bali come from one 
hatchery, PT. Multibreeder Adirama Indonesia Tbk, which is owned by PT. Japfa Comfeed, and most 
vaccine is supplied by one company, PT. Medion in Bandung
58
. 
 
Poultry production in 1998, the worst year of the economic crisis, was less than half the 605kt 
produced in 1996, a drop due to falling demand and the sector’s links to the exchange rate through 
imported feedstuff ingredients. Production exceeded the pre-crisis level only in 2002 (Fabiosa et al 
2004). Extrapolating from 1997 numbers (the last year for which aggregate figures are available), 
Simmons (2006:437) suggests total poultry numbers of just under two billion, divided into 68% 
broilers, 22% native chickens, 7% layers, and 2% ducks, with Java having 60% of the national flock. As 
well as being profitable, the poultry business is considered risky, especially for small producers. Even 
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before the HPAI outbreak, on average 5-10% of birds were lost to illness, most notably Newcastle 
disease. Such birds are (or were) often eaten or sold to petty merchants who visit farms to buy such 
birds (Padmawati and Nichter 2008). 
 
The Indonesian experience fits the common pattern of rising incomes and urbanization leading to 
increased consumption of animal protein, and reduced consumption of rice and other starches. 
Chicken is the most popular meat in Indonesia. In 2005 national consumption was around 1000 kt or 
4.45 kg per head, compared with beef at 2.4 kg and pork at 2.6 kg. Imports in 2005 were minute at 2 
kt, and exports zero (Vanzetti 2007:4). Indonesia does not have the sanitary standards required for 
export to the European Union and Japan, and exports were minimal even before the HPAI outbreak. In 
1999, 50% of the total broiler production was sold as live birds. Integrated producers dispatch roughly 
30% of their output through modern processing and slaughterhouses, which generally sell to 
restaurants, supermarkets and food processors, and 70% to traditional outlets (Fabiosa 2005:5). 
KOMNAS figures suggest that around 1.2 billion chickens are consumed each year nationally
59
. 
 
In addition to 70% of commercial production, all independent production goes to an estimated 
13,000 live poultry markets, or is consumed at home. In Jakarta, for example, live markets account for 
80% of the chickens consumed each day. Normile and Enserink (2007:448) calculate this to be 
300,000 to 400,000 birds daily, but interviewees suggested that the figure is probably closer to one 
million
60
. Women, who usually provision the household, consider it safer to purchase a live bird and 
have it slaughtered than to buy a dressed bird (Padmawati and Nichter 2008). For many, ‘halal’ 
slaughter is important. Supermarkets are not trusted, especially as suppliers of frozen chickens, 
which many think have been injected with water. Most layer farms are privately owned and operated, 
ranging in size from 500 to 15,000 birds. Eggs are collected daily and sold unwashed to local traders 
who distribute them. If birds become ill or stop producing eggs, they are usually eaten by the farmer 
or sent to market. A remarkable concentration of layer egg production exists around Blitar in East 
Java, with farms varying in size between 3,000 and 100,000 birds. Farmers in the area complain that 
large cartels and their outreach of poultry shops and traders are strangling smaller producers. In 
other areas small-scale entrepreneurs claim to be excluded, citing limited information and 
knowledge, and uncertainties due to the concentration and market dominance of powerful business 
groups. Close ties are maintained between a number of large-scale feed producers and dominant 
groups of egg collectors and traders, who gain from the status quo (Kristiansen 2007). 
 
The integrated broiler production system is a complex web of activity centred around poultry 
distributors who usually act as agents for large poultry companies, supplying day-old chicks, feed, 
medicine and sometimes vaccines to contract farmers. Typically between 500 and 5,000 chicks are 
supplied to a set of 20 - 200 farmers who then raise the chicks for 33 - 40 days before returning them 
to the distributor or selling them to traders. Usually, the distributor will sell on to established clients 
such as restaurants and hotels, and the traders will supply local and national markets. Open trucks are 
commonly used for long distance trading, but more locally, transport is by whatever means is at hand: 
trucks, motorcycles, even buses. Manure is harvested and dried for sale to farmers who use it as 
fertiliser. As one informant put it: “If you were going to design a system to spread an infectious 
poultry disease, it would look something like this. Combine it with the number of backyard birds in 
Indonesia, and you have the virus flowing everywhere”61. Figure 1 presents a schematic. Further 
schemes extracted from two detailed studies are in Appendices C and D. 
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Figure 1. Market chain for layer birds on Bali (Thornton 2007:5)  
 
 
 
The lack of regulation and the self-imposed self-sufficiency of the industrial sector have not helped 
the situation. One interviewee explained: “It’s murky and secretive. There’s commercial competition, 
rivalry and no understanding that there is a shared interest”62. Another said: 
 
The big integrators are willing, but they are used to looking after themselves. They know they 
have a problem but they don’t expect any solutions to come from the government. They 
don’t trust the government’s intentions or competence. There is no tradition of dealing with 
animal diseases. There is no tradition of co-operation for the common good. They know what 
bio-security is, and are actively trying to find and deal with the virus, through vaccination 
mainly, but they say, ‘leave us alone. We know what we are doing. Please go and sort out the 
backyard farms. That’s the problem’. Some of them practically dip their workers in 
disinfectant at every step, but if they are going to be brought in to the dialogue, they have to 
be spoken to in their own language. Pointing fingers don’t work63. 
 
Another respondent offered a slightly brighter analysis: 
 
In the last year and a half, attitudes have changed a bit. Some companies are talking more. 
They know which side their bread is buttered on. But there has not been as much focus as 
there should have been on industry and building relations with them. They are isolated, in 
many cases quite happily. The biggest companies are completely integrated from feedstuff 
to fried chicken shops and have influence at the highest levels. The only way you know that 
there is a die off is when you see the smoke from the fires, or trucks of disinfectant going in 
through the gates. Even if there was a law that was enforced, there’s nothing to say that you 
have to report. Involving industry meaningfully is one of the most important practical things 
that can be done. Government and industry need to form a partnership with the same 
objective
64
. 
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There are therefore a remarkable number of actors involved in the Indonesian HPAI epidemic. Aside 
from chicken meat and egg consumers, and the millions who consider backyard birds an important 
part of everyday life, over a million people are closely involved in industrial production: farmers, feed 
suppliers, processors, wholesalers, retailers, transport personnel and shareholders. The government 
is also involved, even though it would prefer not to be. These actors can be resolved into four main 
groups: consumers, backyard farmers, industrial producers, and the government; and the challenges 
of avian influenza in Indonesia become clear when the associated networks, or the lack of them, are 
considered. Short of not purchasing items and staging protests, consumers have few rights in 
Indonesia, and form only fragmented networks, susceptible to media excitement. Backyard farmers 
too generally have no common voice, or networks, beyond their immediate geographical locations. 
They range from the desperately poor to comfortably-off hobbyists, and the government tends to 
interact with them ad hoc, following specific protests for example, and inconsistently.  
 
Similarly, the industrial producers are only just coming to the realisation that they have shared 
interests amongst themselves, and are still a very long way from seeing that they have any interests 
in common with the backyard sector. As yet, even the large and mid-sized producers consider 
themselves as having little in common. Large producers are more concerned about a consumer 
backlash and are keen to deny the existence of disease outbreaks publicly, for example, whilst 
medium-sized producers are more likely to acknowledge outbreaks in order to seek assistance and 
compensation from the government (Simmons 2006). The government network, despite significant 
attempts to co-ordinate a coherent position, and response, still finds itself fundamentally torn 
between industrial and small-scale agriculture (as well as other imperatives) and very largely lacks any 
means of interacting with industrial producers except for the relatively opaque informal 
communications that are a legacy of Suharto’s corporatist era. Add decentralization and the picture 
becomes even more complex.  
 
Underlying these disconnects is a lack, or an undeveloped sense, of a conception of public goods. A 
recent international consultation document
65
 defines public goods as ‘non-rival in consumption and 
having non-excludable benefits, which are consequently neither priced, nor supplied efficiently’. The 
context of the consultation is international public goods, but distinctions are also made, according to 
geography largely, between local public goods, regional public goods, domestic public goods and 
national public goods. In Indonesia, only the concept of local public goods has much traction, 
expressed by the phrase gotong-royong, meaning ‘mutual help’. Whilst this extends (in some parts of 
the country) to the manning of local security/emergency posts, the maintenance of individuals’ 
houses and communal irrigation ditches and terraced rice-paddies, for example, it does not extend to 
the provision of safe pedestrian sidewalks, for example; and notions of centrally managed facilities for 
refuse disposal are very recent. It certainly does not extend to the extermination, or management, of 
an invisible virus. 
 
The highly stratified nature of Indonesian society is probably the most significant factor in this weak 
understanding of public goods. This concept is not familiar, or popular, in the international 
community (and not mentioned in the international consultation document quoted). The Javanese 
language has very formal forms associated with speaking to someone of a higher, a lower, or an equal 
rank, and it is still common to see, even in the most enlightened sectors of Jakarta society, the lower 
ranked physically stooping in the presence of the higher ranked. This doesn’t mean that the well-to-
do don’t care for the less-well-off. Quite the opposite: there are well-defined protocols of 
responsibility associated with higher rank. But the different strata of society do not see themselves as 
having anything in common – of being in the same boat – in any way. Commenting on Jakarta’s 
neglected public parks, an urban development observer suggests: 
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We (Indonesians) are averse to mixing with all layers of society… This socio-cultural problem is 
one of the reasons why parks in Jakarta are yet to become melting pots, where people from 
all social layers gather together
66
. 
 
This sets a conceptual challenge for the government of Indonesia’s young democracy in formation. In 
the bad old days, money simply followed power, and no question of legitimacy was associated with 
the accumulation of either (cf. Anderson 2006). Then, as is still the case often today, the needs of the 
poor were primarily addressed through mechanisms of paternalistic charity, and traditional concepts 
such as gotong-royong were promoted to encourage the poor to look after themselves. Now, there is 
a dawning realisation that sustaining such fractures, and structures, in society is not just morally 
ambiguous, but also dangerous for political stability, and economic growth and prosperity. 
Consequently, a host of questions are arising associated with taxation, the provision of public 
services, representation for minorities, smoking in public places, and more. In nearly all matters of 
state there are conflicting narratives, objectives and interests at play, and the government is 
uncertain as to its role and responsibility in negotiating and forming them into a broadly utilitarian 
response that might be called a public good. Also relevant in this numinous culture is that such a 
universalistic concept as a public good is most often seen as a matter best left to one or more deities. 
 
The international response to HPAI is largely driven by a sophisticated concept of a global public 
good, as illustrated by slogans such as ‘One World One Health’. No one would argue that even the 
local eradication of virus associated with a deadly animal disease is not worth attempting, and there 
are further concerns about the livelihoods of the poor, and food security, but the funds and the 
attention that have followed the spread of avian influenza have largely been generated by the 
possibility of H5N1 evolving into a form that causes a human pandemic that kills millions, and shakes 
stock markets and societies worldwide. The following section will explore this issue in the context of 
the response. What happens when the international community, proclaiming global public good 
objectives, arrives in a place like Indonesia, where notions of public goods are fragmented, contested 
and highly contingent, and where an international public good appears very distant? 
 
THE RESPONSE: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS AND 
NARRATIVES67 
 
Actors associated with the HPAI response include national, international and regional organizations. 
The Departemen Pertanian (Deptan), or Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), is in the front line, supported by 
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The Departemen Kesehatan, or Ministry 
of Health (MoH), is also involved, supported by the United Nations World Health Organization (WHO). 
The national co-ordinating body is the Komiti Nasional Pengendalian Flu Burung dan Kesiapsiagaan 
Menghadapi Pendemi Influenza (KOMNAS FBPI), or the National Committee for Avian Influenza 
Control and Pandemic Influenza Preparedness. This is a ministerial-level committee, headed by the 
Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare Aburizal Bakrie68, created by presidential decree on 7 
March 2006. The committee has 14 members, including the Agriculture, Health, Forestry, National 
Planning (Bappenas) and Industry ministers, the Economics co-ordinating minister, the army 
commander, the police chief, and the chairman of the Indonesian Red Cross. The executive team 
includes six task forces that provide direction on research and development, animal health, human 
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health, vaccine and anti-viral medicines, and mass communications and public information. A 
secretariat and a media centre aid coordination between the ministries, with communications 
supported by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and a similar structure has been 
established in a number of provinces. 
 
Further to the presidential decree of 7 March 2006, on 9 May 2006 the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
issued a letter asking the regions to work with KOMNAS. This stipulated that they should prepare 
plans, take the required operational steps, monitor, evaluate, and report every three months. The 
most important point however was the last: the costs were to be borne by the regional local 
governments
69
. Had central government been in a position to assure, and provide, funding at this 
stage, the situation could look very different today.  
 
KOMNAS and the related agencies are guided by the January 2006 National Strategic Plan for Avian 
Influenza Control and Pandemic Preparedness
70
. This outlines ten strategies based on principles 
advocated by the FAO, the WHO and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE): 
 
1. Control in animals 
2. Management of human cases 
3. Protection of high-risk groups 
4. Epidemiological surveillance for animals and humans 
5. Restructuring the poultry industry 
6. Risk communication, information and public awareness 
7. Strengthening relevant laws 
8. Capacity building 
9. Action research 
10. Monitoring and evaluation 
 
In 2006, the government allocated $57.3 million for control, and in 2007, $52.9 million, with the chief 
executive of KOMNAS seeking $300 million annually
71
. At 30 April 2007, the international community 
had committed $128.15 million in grants (including $25.97 million from Australia, $16.16 million 
from Japan and $8.45 million from the US) and in kind (including $39.18 million from the US, and $12 
million from the Netherlands), of which $89.94 million had been disbursed (UNSIC & World Bank 
2008:87). This is the most committed to any country
72
. In comparison, Vietnam, with $117.6 million 
committed and $56.14 million disbursed, is the second largest beneficiary, and Nigeria with $58.33 
million committed and $38.39 million disbursed, the third. 
 
This adds up to a complex set of relatively well-funded networks. At the national level the response 
requires co-ordination between the MoA and MoH, and both organizations are required to co-
ordinate with KOMNAS. This creates difficulties familiar to anyone who has worked in any civil service. 
“We have two plans in one binder and call it ‘integrated’”, says one closely involved respondent73. 
Another interviewee suggested: “The Ministry of Agriculture doesn’t talk to the Ministry of Health, and 
vice versa. Politics and personalities get in the way”74. And another said: 
 
Agriculture and Health hate the KOMNAS role. They see AI as their problem and ask why 
another organization should be involved. At the Bali simulation in April 2008, the MoH would 
not let their people wear the official jackets as they had KOMNAS on them. Another plan was 
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to embed KOMNAS in the MoA, but MoA said, ‘no way, this is our business’. You would not 
believe the level of dysfunction that exists. There’s now talk of disbanding KOMNAS in 2010, 
but that’s not helping, just adding to the air of uncertainty75. 
 
Yet another informant explained: 
 
KOMNAS has the expert panels. All of the scientific findings go to it. KOMNAS then makes 
recommendations to MoH or MoA, which they don’t like one bit. And implementation 
depends on the ministries. There you find a traditional culture. Initiative is not applauded. 
There is a culture of playing safe, just saying ‘yes’ to the boss. This is a very deep tradition. It 
needs a revolution to make any changes. It is even worse in the regions
76
. 
 
The international agencies, of course, have their own cultures, and are challenged in their own ways 
by organizational, disciplinary and professional divides. In Jakarta, a large FAO team is firmly 
embedded in the MoA, to the south of the city. A significantly smaller WHO team works out of more 
central MoH premises, and UNICEF and UNOCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) 
both have independent offices. One respondent suggested: “The internal [UN] bureaucracy is not 
helpful, especially when combined with that of donor organizations like the EC, which are not exactly 
nimble. The priorities of the donors are not necessarily the same as those of the country, and it’s hard 
work making them fit”77. 
 
Another interviewee, bemoaning the “deluge” of staff coming and going on short-term contracts, 
sees personality as key to co-ordination: 
 
There are monthly meetings between the agencies, which are fine as far they go. There is 
also informal contact – phone calls, meetings at social events – but these depend more on 
whether people get on. Everybody is very busy, very focused on their jobs, and it’s easier to 
find space for someone else’s problem if you get on with them78. 
 
The same issue of personality (or who has whose hand-phone number, or goes to the same parties) 
also clearly pertains to the relationships, and co-ordination, between the national and international 
agencies. In some cases it is obviously very good, in others, less so; but deeper issues are involved in 
the mix. One of the biggest challenges, described by an interviewee, is that: “The UN is not ultimately 
solution-driven. The government has to drive the solution, with UN, and other international agencies, 
facilitating. That is clearly not happening here”79. Another explained: “The focus of the response is 
very, very scientific and this does not fit the local context well. The science is important but it is not a 
solution on its own”80. 
 
Perhaps the greatest fracture between the national and the international is in the conception of a 
human pandemic. Accepting the uncertainty of when, where and magnitude, the international 
agencies and the individuals involved with them appreciate the science of viral evolution and the 
associated inevitability of a human influenza pandemic. But candidly, and almost without exception, 
every Indonesian interviewed admitted that they did not believe a pandemic would occur. One 
explained: 
 
We have no word for pandemic. We just use ‘pandemi’. We have ‘wabah’ for outbreak, but this 
is not pandemic. We have no picture of pandemic. We have no history of events like the Black 
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Death. It is not part even of our imaginary world. Most people have more urgent and 
important things to deal with
81
. 
 
An (international) interviewee said: “There is no conception of the pandemic threat. Politicians need 
to buy in to this. Healthcare workers need to buy in to it. Everything is driven by the short term, the 
here and now”82. Another suggested: “There are people working on the problem who care. But the 
average citizen does not care. It’s like talking to people who don’t drive cars about the importance of 
wearing seat-belts”83. 
 
Thus the scale of the challenge for the international organizations leading the response to HPAI 
becomes clear. In Indonesia, the fourth most populous country in the world, and one of the 
geographically, ecologically and culturally most complex, they have set themselves the task of 
implementing a rigorous and consistent set of programmes in a highly decentralised and politically 
dynamic environment which has not, as yet, provided the opportunity for significant trust to develop 
between civil society and authority, or vice versa. The scale of the problem, and the emergency 
nature of the response, has precluded much in the way of reflection, and the response to date has 
been driven by an overarching ‘outbreak’ narrative (cf. Wald 2008), with veterinarians, doctors and 
communications specialists creating and driving modernist sub-narratives of surveillance, control, 
and behaviour change. But what constitutes an ‘effective’ response in the views of these different 
players? Is a science led, risk mitigation framing obscuring the sorts of disease drivers and related 
factors Farmer (1996) identified: ecological change, demographic change, change in human 
behaviour, increasing complexity, and poverty? Only now are alternative narratives, including food 
security, food safety and animal welfare
84
 being proposed as relevant to HPAI in Indonesia.  
 
Further details of the response are offered below, divided into sections covering agriculture, human 
health and communications. These distinctions reflect both the national administrative structures, 
and the competencies and responsibilities of the international agencies involved. One question is 
whether such divides are appropriate, or helpful? A bigger one is what happens when the 
international community, driven and justified by science, and proclaiming public good objectives, 
arrives in the vague and relatively unruly world of the Indonesian countryside? 
 
CHASING THE CHICKENS 
 
“The plan was put together in a hurry in order to have something for the Beijing meeting85, 
but it was a good plan. The challenge is to make it work”86. 
 
In mid-2005, the MoA in collaboration with FAO, WHO, and other international partners, developed a 
National Strategic Work Plan for the Progressive Control of HPAI in Animals for 2006 – 2008 (Ministry 
of Agriculture 2005). It had an indicative, and ambitious, budget of $322,146,000 over three years 
and consisted of nine elements: campaign management, enhancement of HPAI control in animals, 
surveillance and epidemiology, laboratory services, animal quarantine, legislation and enforcement, 
communications, research and development, and industry restructuring. As the quote above 
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indicates, its production was driven more by an international timetable than a national one. A 
Campaign Management Unit (CMU) within the Directorate General of Livestock Services (DGLS) was 
charged with implementation through nine Regional Management Units (RMUs), which were based 
around nine Disease Investigation Centres (DICs) and 35 Local Disease Control Centres (LDCCs). To 
date, in line with international advice, disease control has focused on culling with compensation 
recommended, vaccination, surveillance and community awareness, improved biosecurity, and 
movement controls. Until late 2007, this activity was almost exclusively focused on the ‘backyard’ 
sector. 
 
Early in the outbreak, in January 2004, the government responded to international pressure by 
announcing that it would cull infected birds, and compensate small farmers
87
. Later that year, in July, 
the policy was extended to include mass culling within a radius of three km of infected sites and 
testing within 20 km, and Rp82.5 billion ($8.42 million) was set aside to finance the measures and 
compensate farmers
88
. Only three days later however, in Tangerang, close to where the first fatal 
human case had occurred, only 31 pigs and 40 ducks were slaughtered, with the Minister of 
Agriculture, Anton Apriyantono, saying that the government lacked the money to live up to its 
promise
89
. Despite a significant decrease in the number of scavenging chickens in some urban areas, 
this pattern of unfulfilled intention has very largely been repeated across the country, with 
Apriyantono explaining that mass culls would cause serious social unrest
90
. 
 
The focus then turned, strategically at least, to focal culling and ring vaccination, and by mid-2008, 
“very restricted voluntary culling” had become the norm91. Most surveillance is now active – MoA 
teams are actively searching for cases in the field – but faced with poultry deaths showing clinical 
signs of HPAI, backyard farmers are supposed to contact their village head who informs the local 
livestock services office. In endemic areas MoA staff will then collect samples from sick or recently 
deceased birds, perform a rapid test for Influenza A, and if positive implement a cull in the immediate 
area. Commercial farmers are supposed to report the event to their distributors who inform the local 
livestock services office, which sends a veterinarian to do a rapid test and/or take samples to a 
laboratory for PCR and virus isolation tests. As part of the integrated plan, humans living nearby are 
sometimes tested too. 
 
In practice, many backyard farmers are reluctant to report die-offs, especially if no family members 
appear to be sick. There is often suspicion of government officials, stigma associated with having an 
outbreak (Padmawati and Nichter 2008), and uncertainty about how to identify HPAI (particularly how 
to distinguish it from Newcastle disease) and to whom outbreaks should be reported. In some areas 
HPAI is referred to as ‘new’ or ‘strong’ Newcastle disease (tetelo) or just ‘plok’, the sound of a dead 
chicken falling from a perch (Normile 2007). Compensation has arguably raised more problems than 
produced solutions. According to government decree, the value of each culled chicken is set at 
Rp10,000 ($1 approximately), with only farmers having flocks up to 5,000 eligible. But poultry market 
prices differ from one region to another, not every die-off is a result of HPAI, and there are practical 
difficulties in distributing any funds that might be available. Simmons (2006:442-3) found only one of 
five producers interviewed on Bali and Lombok had been compensated. One interviewee, an egg 
producer, had had 2,000 birds destroyed and was paid Rp2,000 per bird, which he claimed had been 
negotiated down by government officials from the official Rp10,000.  
 
An informant explained: 
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There is money available, but there is not enough and the mechanism is unclear. The 
provinces are supposed to make an estimate and send a request to central government, 
which will then disburse funds, but a/ how do you make an estimate in these circumstances, 
b/ any estimate then becomes a subject for drawn-out negotiation and c/ in a low-wage 
environment where it is culturally acceptable for everyone to shave a slice for themselves or 
their organization, it’s hard to make a system work where you have to deliver small amounts 
of cash to large numbers of people. The compensation itself becomes a matter of individual 
negotiation. Infrastructure, probity, efficiency, equity are all alien concepts
92
. 
 
Another respondent described the other side of the coin: “Chickens die for all sorts of reasons, and 
there are many cases where a farmer has applied for compensation even though he knows that they 
have not died of AI”93. 
 
The eye of the needle 
 
Vaccination, which decreases susceptibility and virus excretion, is a familiar procedure in the 
industrial sector and widely used for a variety of poultry diseases, including Newcastle disease, but is 
unusual amongst backyard and mid-sized operations. Mass vaccination was first proposed in March 
2004 with plans to provide 300 million doses of a locally produced vaccine – an inactivated H5N1 
isolate from the Legok strain – free of charge to backyard and small farmers. Due largely to limited 
vaccine supply and a realisation of the costs of such large scale provision, mid-2006 saw a change of 
strategy to targeted vaccination using an inactivated LPAI vaccine, with eleven of the most affected 
provinces targeted
94
. At that time, a decision was also made to prioritize control in animals, 
epidemiological surveillance, and information and public awareness, as these were determined to be 
most likely to impact on the spread of the virus (Samaan 2007). 
 
Implementing and managing mass vaccination campaigns in backyards and villages is a different 
order of activity from vaccinating in relatively ordered industrial settings, and Indonesia has achieved 
only partial success (cf. Thornton 2007). A cold chain is required and Indonesia has seen recurring 
controversies over vaccine quality from both domestic and foreign suppliers, particularly China. 
Confusion has also arisen regarding the legality of importing vaccines, and a scandal erupted in 
October 2005 in which officials were allegedly complicit with vaccine producers in lowering vaccine 
quality in order to boost profits
95
. Mass vaccination is doubtlessly hard to accomplish in a backyard 
setting, and is unpopular with veterinarians. It requires repeated administration, and owners are 
suspicious as birds sometimes die after vaccination (Padmawati and Nichter 2008). 
 
One respondent explained: 
 
In theory vaccination solves the problem, but implementing it on the scale required here is 
impossible. Imagine… you arrive in a village with 500 chickens wandering about the place. 
They belong to everybody and nobody. There are no fences and no coops. In all each bird will 
need five or six injections over a year – an initial dose, a booster after three weeks, and then a 
booster every quarter. This means that the catchers and the vaccinators will need to visit five 
times with the right vaccine which has been sourced and stored properly, and the right 
equipment, and deliver it correctly to the relevant animal. In the long term it is just not 
sustainable
96
. 
 
                                                     
92
 Interview, Jakarta 11 August 2008 
93
 Interview, Jakarta 13 August 2008 
94
 ‘Vaccine shortage hampers government's bird flu fight’ Jakarta Post 11/04/06 
95
 Jakarta Post 8/10/05 
96
 Interview, Jakarta 13 August 2008 
33 
 
 
This situation is exacerbated by a lack of veterinarians and appropriately skilled people, particularly in 
provincial and district government service. A senior veterinarian with the Bogor Institute of 
Agriculture, is quoted as saying that there are only 200 animal health posts nationwide, and that “half 
of the posts are not functioning”97. Five veterinary faculties (Aceh, Bogor, Yogyakarta, Surabaya and 
Bali) produce only 70 to 120 graduates a year each, and industry provides better wages than 
government employment. Commonly quoted statistics suggest that there is one vet active for 
20,000 people or 4,500 sq km, with less than 20 working on average per district, and with some outer 
provinces (Papua, Maluku, East Nusatenggara are considered the worst provided for) having only one 
or two vets
98
. In March 2007, the MoA estimated that 154,000 vaccinators were needed for the 
country, and that costs per year would total $166,593,000
99
. 
 
The medical community too has reservations about the vaccination programme. The director of one 
of the leading avian influenza designated hospitals has suggested that improper vaccination may be 
helping to spread the virus
100
. An interviewee was more explicit: 
 
Half-baked vaccination programmes do nothing to help. The vaccine is too widely dispersed 
and there is no monitoring of drift. There are also questions about the virus strains being 
used. Vaccination seems to have repressed the virus to a degree, but it may well just be 
concealing the virus and complicating surveillance
101
. 
 
Another said: “We have some answers and one of them is that mass vaccination is NOT a strategy in 
Indonesia”102. 
 
Vaccination is a clear example of a rational, technocratic, international-led solution running into the 
finely grained sand of Indonesia’s numinous, high variegated, here-and-now culture. Another is the 
notion of clear and comprehensive movement controls. The Quarantine Service operates under 
Regulation 82 of 2000 on Animal Quarantine, and is responsible for protecting each island from 
contamination by foreign and domestic animal diseases. It is however not under the control of the 
Directorate of Animal Health and suffers even more severe challenges of competence and resources 
than other parts of the national civil service. It should be noted that the complex geography makes 
comprehensive control virtually impossible, but in theory at least, had this agency been aware and 
active in the early days of the outbreak, there is a chance that HPAI could have been contained on 
Java. In 2004, transport of live birds (including fighting cocks) was banned between Java and the 
eastern islands, including Bali and Lombok. However DGLS certified day-old chicks and chilled and 
frozen poultry meat were still traded (Simmons 2006:442). Poultry also continued to be smuggled, or 
moved by small traders who were unaware of the ban. Ketutsutawijaya
103
 suggests: 
 
Poultry smuggling in Indonesia can happen from island to island, and smuggling city to city 
within the same village [sic]. Smuggling is common due to the price differentiation is so big 
between each areas [sic]. Example, smuggling ducks from East Java province to Bali province. 
In Bali, duck price can up to Rp35,000 each, since many people demand ducks as one of the 
main component in their religious ceremony. While in East Java, duck price only Rp15,000 
each [sic]. Chicken smuggling from Sulawesi and Surabaya heads to Papua. In Papua, chicken 
price is up to Rp150,000 each (kampong chicken). While in their origin place (Sulawesi and 
Surabaya), the price is only Rp30,000 each. Another smuggling area is Lampung to Java. 
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As an interviewee put it: “Anybody can move anything around. There is legal and illegal trading over a 
vast area. If you are stopped, you simply pay a tax and go on”104. Similar practical issues often pertain 
to matters such as caging, bio-security and the disposal of infected carcasses. One respondent 
explained: “In the poorer parts of the eastern islands, for example, many houses are not much better 
than what would be called chicken coops in the West”105. 
 
Science meets society 
 
Since January 2006 the core of avian influenza control in Indonesia has been the Participatory 
Disease Surveillance and Response (PDSR) project, a collaboration between the Ministry of 
Agriculture, local government livestock services and the FAO, supported primarily by USAID, AusAID, 
and the government of Japan. The project is based on a qualitative approach to epidemiology known 
as participatory epidemiology, which has the objective of developing and supporting a community-
based response to detecting and preventing the disease by using local knowledge of where and when 
outbreaks are occurring, and enlisting the local population in control efforts. It has much in common 
with established techniques of participatory rural appraisal (PRA) but has evolved significantly in 
Indonesia. The first phase of the PDSR project emphasized the detection and control of HPAI by 
separate surveillance and response teams primarily in ‘backyard’ settings at the household level. Now, 
a broader village-level approach encompasses all poultry farmers, traders and community leaders; a 
greater stress is put on empowering communities to understand the origin, prevention and control of 
all poultry diseases; and better links are sought with veterinary services, where capacity is being 
developed through PDSR. 
 
Four pilot studies were initially run in four LDCC (Local Disease Control Centre) locations across three 
provinces in Java, involving 52 local government livestock services officers. By mid-2008, 2,112 
officers, including 353 qualified veterinarians and 945 people with no official animal health 
qualifications, were operating in 27 of 33 provinces across 331 of Indonesia’s 448 districts. Supported 
by large-scale awareness campaigns in the national and local media, the PDSR teams visit villages, 
meet with community leaders, key informants and poultry farmers, with the objectives of gaining 
trust from the community and understanding historical and active poultry disease better. Each team 
reports their activities to a LDCC, which enters reports into a LDCC database, which is then sent to the 
MoA, where all LDCC databases are compiled into a central database. When active outbreaks are 
encountered, the teams have rapid tests
106
 available to confirm HPAI, and with support from the 
affected community, infected birds are subsequently culled and disposed of, infected properties 
disinfected, movement controls implemented, and the local medical authorities or District 
Surveillance Officers contacted. From January 2006 to September 2008, PDSR teams made 177,306 
surveillance visits, responded to 6,011 cases of HPAI and worked with over 2.1 million community 
members
107
. 
 
In its totality, the FAO-supported project has grown into a remarkably large enterprise involving 
recruiting, training and managing a large number of staff spread over a wide geographical area. Much 
work has also gone into database development and management. After an initial focus on 
households, since 1 April 2008 the database has been based on the village as the epidemiological 
                                                     
104
 Interview, Jakarta 14 August 2008 
105
 Interview, Jakarta 13 August 2008 
106
 The influenza type A rapid test (Anigen©) only distinguishes between HA or HI virus/titers. PCR (Polymerase 
Chain Reaction) tests are more specific, and can take only two hours, but a laboratory is required, negatives 
need to be confirmed, and results may not be available for a week. A definitive isolation test – culturing the 
sample in a medium – usually takes seven to ten days. According to Padmawati and Nichter (2008:40) testing 
delays are often used to ‘harvest’ healthy chickens. 
107
 FAO unpublished 
35 
 
 
unit
108
. The second phase of the project has also broadened the range of stakeholders involved to 
include district, provincial and central governments as well as local communities, and incorporates 
conventional, quantitative epidemiological techniques. Other FAO-supported activities include 
running workshops designed to inform and enlist local government officials and decision makers, 
developing procedures for collecting and transporting virus samples for laboratory testing, local-level 
focus group discussions, commercial industry profiling, newsletter and communications production, 
testing vaccination protocols, and studying poultry movements, marketing and socio-economics. 
 
At a number of levels, the PDSR project is doubtlessly a success. Non-veterinarians associated with 
the broader response comment admiringly on the scale of the operation, its organization and sense 
of purpose
109
. The locally orientated, boots-on-the ground, approach represents a significant attempt 
to meet the requirements of Indonesia’s diverse complexity on its own terms, and the human face it 
puts on a necessarily massive enterprise is valuable. An interviewee associated with the project said: 
 
In some areas, such as Lampung province in Sumatra for example, the programme has had 
significant success in disease control. More widely, the high number of reported cases for 
Indonesia in 2007-8 is due entirely to PDSR, and the data-collection, processing and analysis 
system, especially in its second-generation form, is providing an understanding of the 
dynamics of disease spread and control that just did not exist before. Looking to the future, 
I’d say that it is projects like this that stand the best chance of helping to rebuild veterinary 
services post decentralization and the financial crisis, and to evolve into a surveillance, 
prevention and control programme that addresses other animal and zoonotic diseases in the 
way that the One World One Health initiative is calling for
110
. 
 
Other respondents, some close to the project, are more critical. One suggests: 
 
The problem is with the R in PDSR. The teams can measure but they can’t respond effectively. 
They don’t have the authority to cull. They can’t vaccinate. All they can do is talk. This 
sometimes has the required outcomes, but what is required is an assured, standard cull and 
compensate response to isolated outbreaks
111
. 
 
There are other challenges, some very prosaic and frustrating. The FAO, for example, has been 
struggling to obtain the appropriate tax-exempt status for 480 motorcycles before deploying them to 
the field
112. As one respondent put it: “FAO is tasked with making this happen in the field but FAO is 
not traditionally an implementer on such a scale. It is working remarkably well with MoA, but I do 
wonder whether the role of the organization is to run a branch of the national civil service”113. 
Another suggested: “The expansion has been too fast. This is one problem of being driven by donors, 
who are always asking how big can you make it, how fast can you go? Here we train people for two 
weeks and push them out of the door. We’ve created a response platform, but the strategy is 
questionable”114. 
 
One less obvious good, which is seen as tangible by some, is that communication with industry is 
better given hard facts about what is going on in the environment surrounding their facilities
115
. One 
interviewee suggested: 
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Industry is now more willing to talk about zoning and compartmentalization. We know that 
small farms are awash with the disease. We know that industry has problems, but not much 
more. The problem is probably linked and self-perpetuating. We need to know more about 
the market chains. We need to know more about feed. Only now is that work starting to be 
done
116
.  
 
The Operational Research (OR) project is one of the most ambitious and recent initiatives, launched 
in June 2008 in 16 districts of three provinces (West Java, Central Java and Yogyakarta). Led by the 
MoA, working in collaboration with FAO and the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), OR 
examines the feasibility and impact of alternative controls through a longitudinal study to measure 
the effectiveness and feasibility of four measures: a) a PDSR control group, b) PDSR plus HPAI 
vaccination, c) PDSR plus HPAI and Newcastle Disease vaccination and d) PDSR with immediate 
compensation for culled birds. Alongside procuring and delivering vaccines and testing kits, and 
moving samples to laboratories, and monitoring, the project involves 1,088 vaccinators. “We have to 
find them, train them, employ them, and supervise them,” said one interviewee. “At the moment it is 
simply a huge vortex that is sucking everything in. We are at the stage where we are snowed under 
just working out what is going on, let alone doing anything about it”117. Even with all the work done to 
date, it is clear that the response is still in its relatively formative early days, and that effort, expertise 
and funding, will be required for years into the future. 
 
Although relations between the international agencies and the government are significantly better in 
agriculture than in health (see Viruses and sovereignty below), and by all accounts the FAO in 
particular has a good working relationship with the MoA, political complications exist further up the 
ladder. One informant said: “There needs to be priority and focus. This is basically an agricultural 
problem and agriculture should be leading. But agriculture people don’t have the influence”118. 
Another suggested: 
 
I don’t believe agriculture has a high enough priority on the national agenda – the future is 
seen as development through industry and services – and I don’t believe avian influenza is a 
high enough priority within the MoA. The CMU [HPAI Central Management Unit] sits too low in 
the hierarchy. By a lucky fluke the country is self-sufficient in rice this year and the minister 
thinks that’s enough. There are people struggling to do good work, but it’s not resourced well 
enough, it lacks influence, it’s ad hoc, and it’s not supported internally. Funding is going down 
right now, and only the most long-sighted of the donors are prepared to commit to more 
than a year. You can’t successfully address a protracted problem like this on a year-by-year 
basis. We are dealing with a number of donors too, and they have subtly different objectives. 
In these circumstances it’s difficult to put together a coherent programme”119. 
 
Even in this less than ideal political and operational environment, the veterinary and agricultural 
responses to HPAI have been determined and well co-ordinated across a remarkably large 
geographical area and range of activities. Those close to the programmes are at pains to stress that 
despite the challenges, there have been successes in controlling the disease in some regions. 
However, even if this is now appreciated in the control room of the MoA, together with the scale of 
problem, and the time and effort that is going to be required to bring the disease under control, there 
are still significant uncertainties as to which aspects of the activities have been responsible. A 
standard cull and compensate approach (‘stamping out’) is inevitably challenged and unpopular 
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unless the mechanisms and delivery of compensation are consistent, transparent and timely, which 
they are not. Given Indonesia’s geography, lax regulatory regimes and under resourced and inefficient 
enforcement processes, movement controls are not going to reach the required standards soon 
either. “It only takes one chicken,”120 was how one interviewee put it, and that ignores feed, feet, 
feathers, meat, unwashed eggs, manure and more. Vaccination, the ultimate technological fix, solves 
the problem in theory, text-book style, but a question mark hangs over the practicalities of 
implementing it across every village and backyard in the country, placed there most clearly by those 
who have been in the field trying to do it.   
 
What is more difficult to measure, however, and what therefore is in danger of being, if not ignored, at 
least undervalued, is the human face presented by thousands of people on the ground concerned 
primarily with the welfare of poultry. Whilst those involved in managing the response, especially those 
from the international community, have a clear understanding of the necessity of a robust response, 
and the (global) public good attached to it, as discussed previously, such conceptions are not 
widespread amongst the population. A respondent involved in a socio-economic study in Jakarta 
explained: 
 
The people did not want to tell us they had poultry. They hid from us and they hid their 
poultry from us. We were blamed. They said we were stupid. Even though we were officials 
trying to help they were rude to us and didn’t welcome us. It’s very difficult to make them 
understand as they have been farming like this for centuries. They say: ‘Look at us. We have 
chickens but we are not sick’.121 
 
As ‘enhanced bio-security’ emerges as a further component of the veterinary and agricultural 
response, the educative potential of trained people on the ground is going to become even more 
important, along with trust in them and what they say. As will be discussed in the following section, 
people do sometimes get sick, and die. 
 
HUMANS AT RISK? 
 
“The biggest issue is that there is practically no understanding of germ theory in the 
population, almost no conception of it at all”122. 
 
The first WHO lab-confirmed Avian Influenza A/H5N1 human case, and death, was reported in July 
2005, a 38 year old man from Tangerang near Jakarta, whose two daughters, aged one and eight, also 
died
123
. By 12 December 2008, Indonesia had more human cases, and more deaths, than any country 
in the world. Of the 139 laboratory confirmed cases, 113 have been fatal. West Java, the capital 
Jakarta, and Banten (on Java’s most western tip) have seen the majority of events with 95 cases and 
81 deaths. In comparison, Central Java has had 11 cases and ten deaths, East Java seven cases and 
five deaths, Bali two cases and two deaths, South Sulawesi one case and one death, and Sumatra 23 
cases and 14 deaths. 
 
Compared with other causes of death in Indonesia – infectious and chronic diseases, accidents, 
malnutrition and aging – avian influenza cannot even be described as a blip on the chart. This, as 
illustrated by the final comment in the previous section, causes a huge disconnect between the 
(global) public good construction driving the eradication of HPAI, and constructions and 
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understandings of the danger on the ground. More than anyone, the Indonesian and international 
doctors and epidemiologists working in the MoH, realise what the consequences of a pandemic will 
be, especially for a relatively poor and relatively unprepared country like Indonesia. But they are faced 
with huge challenges in making the case that HPAI is an urgent problem that needs concerted effort 
and action at all levels. If the government’s response is largely reactive, there has been little to drive 
attention or action in the human health domain. Chickens are everywhere, especially in the 
countryside, but the disease is so rare as to be barely noticeable. Furthermore, concerning matters of 
disease and death, fatalistic, numinous notions push forwards strongly in many cultures, not just in 
Indonesia.  
 
Even in Tangerang, immediately north-west of Jakarta, which has had a remarkable number of cases, 
life remains essentially unchanged. An interviewee explained: 
 
It’s obvious that human cases are concentrated very much around Jakarta and the western 
end of Java, where the population density is the highest. This is possibly a surveillance artefact 
- Jakarta is better informed, and better off, so people are more likely to report. But you walk 
between the tower blocks and you find a village with live markets, teeming life, even chickens 
scratching around. This is life in Indonesia. Tangerang is the hottest spot. There is still a 
concentration of poultry farming and processing there, and a high level of traffic movements 
in and out of the city. In my opinion, the markets drive the problem in Jakarta, the movements 
of birds and people in and out of the city
124
. 
 
Adult deaths divide into roughly equal numbers of males and females. Sedyaningsih et al (2007:524) 
investigated 598 suspected cases in Indonesia between July 2005 and June 2006, of which 54 were 
confirmed and 41 fatal: a case-fatality proportion of 76%. Confirmed cases ranged in age from 18 
months to 45 years, 53% were under 20 and 24% under ten. Forty-one case patients (76%) had had 
direct or indirect contact with poultry during the preceding two weeks, and six case patients (11%) 
had poultry-related occupations, including three farm workers, two live market workers and one 
shuttlecock feather selector. More than one third (54 cases) occurred in seven clusters among blood 
relatives, suggesting a possible genetic susceptibility; and increases in human cases have been 
observed in the cooler, wetter months. One interviewee complained: “Cases decline in the annual dry 
season, so interest drops off and people forget about it. Then when cases rise again in January and 
February, there’s a realisation that the problem has not gone away. It’s very difficult to keep AI in 
people’s minds”125. The same, medically trained, informant made the comment on the popular 
understanding of germ theory, which began this section. It is not just with respect to avian influenza 
that the medical community is faced with uphill work. 
 
Nevertheless, some very detailed work has been accomplished. An analysis of 340 cases globally to 
14 December 2007 found that direct avian-to-human virus transmission is the predominant means of 
infection, and handling sick or dead poultry is the most commonly recognized risk factor (WHO 
2008:262). Bird-to-human transmission is believed to occur largely by infected bird secretions being 
inhaled or transferred with contaminated hands to the mouth, nose or eyes (Vong et al 2008:1304) 
with the virus replicating primarily in the human respiratory tract. Slaughtering, defeathering, or 
preparing sick poultry for cooking; playing with or handling diseased or dead poultry; handling 
fighting cocks and ducks that appear to be well; and consuming raw or undercooked poultry or 
poultry products have all been implicated in transmission. There is evidence that the virus replicates 
in the gastrointestinal tract and that infection is possible through ingestion of contaminated food and 
water (ibid). In Indonesia, contact with fertilisers containing poultry excreta is also considered a risk 
factor (Lye et al 2006:472). 
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The fact remains that H5N1 is a very rare disease in humans (Sedyaningsih et al 2007:527). It is also 
difficult to diagnose and confirm. The most common symptoms are fever, shortness of breath and 
cough, with pneumonia showing on chest radiograph. Testing involves confirming viral RNA in throat 
swabs, endotracheal aspirates and lung biopsy samples (from the deceased) by conventional or real 
time reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR). Serum samples can also be tested for 
H5N1 using H5-specific antisera. These tests are available in Indonesia, but WHO confirmation 
requires samples to be tested in a WHO reference lab, which for Indonesia is (or was, see Viral 
sovereignty, below) usually the University of Hong Kong or the US Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta. Rapid antigen tests are also used, but Lye et al (2006:472) suggest that 
the results have been ‘almost uniformly unhelpful’. 
 
The Ministry of Health, supported by the WHO and donors that include USAID, AusAID and the 
government of Japan, has responded by designating 44 hospitals nationwide (previously SARS 
centres) as specialist H5N1 referral centres, providing antiviral treatment at provincial and district 
levels, training health care workers, building laboratory capacity (currently there are two labs in the 
country with BSL-3 capacity), providing personal protection equipment for health workers, 
developing information systems, and establishing a command post in the ministry. Sero-surveillance 
programmes and information campaigns have also been run, aimed at market and poultry workers 
particularly. In November 2006, MoH launched a community level initiative focusing on 12,000 
remote villages, and in April 2007 the Integrated Surveillance for Avian Influenza (ISAI) Project was 
launched linking human surveillance with animal surveillance through collaboration with MoA and 
FAO. By the end of 2007, 170 District Surveillance Officers in nine provinces had been trained and 
equipped
126
. 
 
Compared with the numbers trained to recognise and respond to the disease in chickens, however, 
this number is miniscule. Those involved, on both the medical and agricultural sides, would say that 
the virus is most prevalent in poultry, and that the threat to humans is best addressed there. One 
interviewee, commenting on the involvement of the international community more broadly in 
Indonesian agricultural affairs, said: “If it wasn’t for avian influenza, we wouldn’t have much to do 
here. Except perhaps on the eastern islands, particularly when the weather goes wrong, the country is 
doing all right. It’s feeding people and going forwards”127. An international veterinarian agreed, citing 
the spread of rabies as the only other significant zoonotic threat currently facing the country
128
.  
 
But with respect to human health, difficult questions of priorities inevitably arise. It is accepted that 
Indonesia made substantial improvements in health care in the 1970s and 1980s (Kristiansen and 
Santoso 2006), but H5N1 is doubtlessly putting a further strain on an already stretched system. 
Malaria, pulmonary tuberculosis, diarrhoeal diseases, pneumonia and HIV/AIDS are prevalent. 
Typhoid, tetanus and rabies are continuing problems, as is child under-nutrition in some regions, and 
significant outbreaks of Dengue Haemorrhagic Fever occurred in 2004 and poliomyelitis in 2005. 
With demand for healthcare increasing due to economic growth, urbanisation and ageing, 
government spending is falling. According to Kristiansen and Santoso (2006:249) spending on 
primary health care reduced by 25% per capita between 1996/1997 and 1999/2000, and fell a 
further 38% during the years 2000-2004. The number of medical doctors to 1,000 people is the 
lowest in the region at 0.13
129
 and the World Bank currently considers Indonesia’s health spending to 
be ‘low’ at less than 3% of GDP130, which WHO suggests is $33 per capita (in US dollars) and $118 (in 
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international dollars
131
). In July 2007, the president announced that central government had allocated 
Rp20 trillion ($2.22 billion) or about 2.6% of the state budget for health
132
.  
 
Since 2001, managerial and financial responsibilities for public health care have been decentralized 
from central government to the district level, and health care is increasingly privatized. The 
healthcare system is also in the middle of a major transformation characterised by what has been 
described as contradictory trends in which centralization co-exists with decentralization and strong 
state control parallels market-driven healthcare (Ramesh and Wu 2008:174 citing WHO 2004). The 
private sector accounts for 67% of all hospitals. Public health clinics (puskesmas) and family planning 
clinics are free, and public hospitals charge fees based on the class of accommodation. About 15% of 
the population are covered by private health insurance schemes and 21% by public programmes 
(Kristiansen and Santoso 2006:250). In 2005, the National Social Security System (Sistem Jaminan 
Sosial Nasional) was launched to cover some 60 million of the poorest, with a budget allocation of 
US$144.33 million, or approximately $2.4 per person
133
. Nevertheless, social and geographic 
disparities in access to, and quality of, health services are considered to be on the increase, with 
about two thirds of total health expenditure coming out of pocket (Ramesh and Wu 2008:174). 
 
Thus there is a common reluctance among the poor to seek medical assistance due to the fear of 
high costs (Kristiansen and Santoso 2006:252 citing Hunter 2004), and very different pictures 
between the different strata of society as to the availability of medical care, and what it should 
constitute. To date, avian influenza has been a disease of the poor and either the rural, or those living 
on urban peripheries. If anyone of any significant financial means became ill with the disease, 
especially in Jakarta, they would quickly be in hospital and receiving care. This may result in under 
reporting of H5N1 infection, and the relatively high mortality rate. In some areas treatment of human 
H5N1 infection is reputed to be free
134
, but as an interviewee explained, this does not necessarily 
solve the problem: “What happens if you report to hospital like a good citizen and it turns out you 
don’t have the disease? Do you then get a bill? There’s not much trust”135. Only the more severe cases 
may reach medical attention (Lye et al 2006:474), and late initiation of therapy appears to be a major 
factor in the high mortality rate (WHO 2008:268). The non-specific clinical presentation of H5N1 has 
also resulted in mis-diagnosis of subsequently confirmed cases (WHO 2008). In other likely cases, 
specimens have not been available for testing, and some infections have probably not been identified 
due to the use of unsuitable primers and probes in the RT-PCR test process. 
 
Despite these grim facts, informants familiar with the Indonesian health system, and the H5N1 
response, suggest that the designated referral hospitals are now reasonably well equipped to deal 
with sporadic cases. One said: 
 
The hospitals are getting better. They have isolation facilities, protocols and drugs. Staff are 
trained in technical specifics, but nurses lack access to basic training – simple things like 
waste management, occupational health and safety. Similarly, there are labs that can detect 
the disease, grow the virus and test at a genomic level, but there are questions about the 
skills available to interpret data, and I’ve seen work I can only describe as sloppy. The 
variability of influenza viruses calls for frequent updating of primers and probes and that 
doesn’t always happen. There are always financial pressures, and sometimes they are used as 
excuses to cut corners. There are no lab bees obsessed with getting it right. You are never 
sure about quality control
136
. 
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Others stress the low capacity and poor adaptability of the health system. One respondent suggested: 
“There is no shortage of funds for AI but it is hard to spend the money because the baseline is so low. 
The ministry of health and the culture here is so slow. There is no sense of urgency at all”137. Another 
spoke of poor medical understanding: 
 
Sometimes Indonesian doctors leave me aghast at their decision-making. I’ve seen mis-
diagnosis, mis-prescription and over-prescription. What this means is that flu patients might 
get to hospital on day four or day six and are told that they have dengue and are sent home. 
Others with the disease who do get to hospital decide to go home for no reason other than 
they want to. There is often what I can only describe as a mystical approach
138
. 
 
Yet detection of H5N1 in humans is rated as reasonable. An interviewee said: “Sure, there are 
sporadic deaths that are not investigated – like any disease – but I’d say that there is now the capacity 
to detect clusters. Karo, for example, is a very remote area, but the second case there in 2006 was 
detected”139. 
 
The medical community falls into two (not uncomplimentary) camps. One focuses on the need for 
more pure research. An interviewee said: 
 
A lot of research is needed. What is going on with the clusters of blood relatives? Why are 
more poultry workers not catching the disease? How is the virus changing? The fact is that 
the countries where cases are occurring rarely have the capacity to do this work, and the 
countries that don’t have many cases are not inclined to do the work. But here research 
raises a red flag in the ministry. It’s so sensitive140. 
 
The other focuses more on the need for organizational change, capacity building and skill-set 
improvement. A medically qualified interviewee suggested: 
 
In the medical sphere there’s too much emphasis on lab capacity strengthening and 
analysing the virus, as if that is going to fix the problem. In other countries, public health 
experts, civil servants, managers have all made useful inputs. Here the scientists are the 
designers and they usually don’t have much idea about what is going to work in the real 
world
141
. 
 
All agree however that real world politics, particularly the style and manner of leadership in the MoH, 
have intervened in the medical response and made basic and important medical work more difficult, 
if not impossible. This situation is examined in more detail in the penultimate section, Viruses and 
sovereignty. As things stand, however, as far as H5N1 is concerned, the most salient facts are that 
Indonesia is totally dependent on the international community for the provision of front line anti-viral 
drugs (of which some stocks exist in the country, ticking towards their expiry dates
142
) and any human 
vaccines that might be produced in the months following the outbreak of a human epidemic. 
Oshitani at al (2008) argue that developing countries will probably be more badly affected by a 
pandemic than industrialised countries. Changing these circumstances will be the work of years, or 
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decades
143
, and faced with the low capacity and competing priorities associated with health care, 
even the doctors most determined to have some influence in the H5N1 response realise that a 
utilitarian public good, most certainly one with a national perspective, would focus on TB, dengue 
fever, or diarrhoeal diseases, for example, rather than the threat of an influenza pandemic. Despite 
the fatalistic nature of the culture, the individuals and organizations dealing with such future-leaning 
aspects of the response as pandemic planning and emergency preparedness may actually be having 
an easier time than the international medical community, who give the impression that they are 
simply keeping their heads down and trying to get some work done. Natural disasters hit Indonesia 
regularly, and few have yet forgotten the death and devastation caused by the Indian Ocean tsunami 
at the end of 2004.  
 
There is also a well-founded appreciation in the medical community that H5N1 is best dealt with 
before it infects humans. As well as attacking the disease in animals, this involves increasing 
awareness of the virus and its potential consequences amongst the population, and attempting to 
change behaviour that puts people at risk. This is the subject of the next section. 
 
AGITATING FOR CHANGE 
 
“A dead chicken is a dead chicken. There’s no demand from the population to discover why. 
Avian mortality is just not an issue. On Bali for example, about a third of the birds are eaten, a 
third are used in ceremonies, and a third die. This is the way it always has been. The challenge 
is to encourage the communities to understand what is going on and be responsible”144. 
 
A wide range of organizations are involved in public communications and information initiatives, led 
by KOMNAS FBPI. They are all challenged by attitudes that see regular poultry deaths as normal and 
unavoidable, as illustrated by the comment above. UNICEF and Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI), 
working with government, national, regional and other international groups, run the largest projects, 
which are focused on raising awareness and spreading information about how to recognize the 
disease and stop its spread. There is significant cross over, but UNICEF leans more to addressing the 
disease in humans, and DAI to addressing the disease in animals. Broad objectives include supporting 
community planning and mobilization, promoting community-based disease surveillance, and 
building local subcontractor capacity. Not all activities are centrally monitored or funded. One 
respondent said: “There are literally hundreds of activities, nearly all of which are useful. But they are 
fragmented and this means they are less effective”145. 
 
DAI’s USAID-funded Community-Based Avian Influenza Control (CBAIC) project was launched in July 
2006. It operates in three main spheres. One links with KOMNAS, and other government ministries, to 
strengthen pandemic preparedness at national, provincial and district levels. This involves facilitating 
meetings to improve coordination within and between the relevant ministries and local government 
offices, training government spokespeople, and drafting and producing leaflets and other 
communications material. The second sphere is more local: managing and coordinating community 
mobilization and training. This involves running events and training workshops, and producing a wide 
range of materials including booklets, banners, T-shirts, calendars, videos, posters and stickers. By 
mid-2008, DAI counted around 25,000 volunteers trained to recognize HPAI symptoms and respond 
to outbreaks, and the involvement and activities of local organizations such as Muhammadiyah, one 
of the country’s biggest Muslim groups, and the Indonesian Red Cross, were seen as significant 
successes in broadening the scope and the appeal of the communications response. The third, 
                                                     
143
 On 24 April 2007, WHO approved initial grants of $2.5m each to six manufacturers from Brazil, India, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand, and Vietnam to establish production capacity for flu vaccines. See 
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/334/7600/925-a accessed 5 October 2008 
144
 Interview, Jakarta 13 August 2008 
145
 Interview, Jakarta 12 August 2008 
43 
 
 
overlapping, sphere of activity (in partnership with the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public 
Health’s Center for Communication Programs) is to develop and implement a range of behaviour 
change communication programmes. The most recent and prominent of these was a series of 
nationwide television and radio public service announcements (PSAs), which ran from January to April 
2008. These 30-second TV spots were dramatic and hard hitting – dead chickens, alarms, hospitals, 
human deaths – with the messages of burn and bury infected chickens and report the incident. The 
broad objective was to raise the level of perceived threat of human disease amongst the general 
population. 
 
In September 2006, UNICEF, with funding from the government of Japan, and working closely with 
KOMNAS, launched a national awareness raising campaign called ‘Tanggap Flu Burung’ (‘Take Action 
on Bird Flu’). The campaign’s keystone was a memorable thumbs-up hand symbol with four key 
messages on the fingers: don’t touch sick or dying birds; wash your hands before eating and cook 
poultry well; separate new birds from the flock for two weeks; and report flu-like symptoms and seek 
medical attention, especially after contact with birds. The campaign included public concerts (one 
notable event in October 2006 brought more than 10,000 people together in Gowa, South Sulawesi 
for a celebrity pop concert), billboards, and the production and distribution of leaflets and other 
materials. Most prominent however was a four-month radio and television campaign consisting of 
four light-hearted 30-second spots (one for each of the four key messages) introduced by a well-
known talk-show host. 
 
In May 2007, the ‘Take Action’ campaign was expanded with a social mobilization and education 
programme that involved distributing 1,200 avian flu kits, containing masks, gloves, soap, banners, 
stickers, an instructional booklet and video compact discs, to community leaders in some 100,000 
villages in high-risk areas, and this is now being extended to over 50,000 schools across Indonesia. 
The focus is on Java, South Sulawesi, Bali, and four provinces in Sumatra, with smaller-scale 
programmes running in Papua, Maluku, Aceh, and East Nusatenggara provinces. The school kits 
include a comic book and other material using the characters of a popular television show, and 
teachers are being encouraged to incorporate avian influenza related material into the curriculum. 
More recently, UNICEF has implemented a related child-orientated programme that includes games, 
an animated film and television advertisements. In addition to these mass media and grass roots 
campaigns, UNICEF also supports media relations and communications at KOMNAS FBPI, is involved 
with the same group in developing pandemic preparedness planning, and conducts avian influenza 
related training for journalists. Looking to 2009, UNICEF plans to roll out a radio drama series, 
produce a new set of public service announcements, and distribute a booklet for religious leaders
146
. 
 
Aside from this centrally coordinated activity, a wide range of events including rallies, parades and 
health walks have been initiated by all sorts of independent groups. In December 2006, for example, a 
student group was sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture to travel around the country spreading a 
poultry hygiene message and encouraging people to eat chicken. In West Java, a Sundanese 
performance group has produced the Flu Burung Longser Show, a comic opera using songs, 
drumming and dances. Professional groups such as the Hotel & Restaurant Association have also 
been engaged and UN system organizations not seen as central to the avian influenza response have 
been active. The International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International Union of Food Workers 
(IUF), for example, plan to replicate a project run in Thailand promoting good workplace practice in 
the commercial poultry sector. UNESCO, with partners, has been distributing poultry cages and 
running workshops on Bali. 
 
This blizzard of activity has been very successful in raising general awareness, but has not yet had 
time to show convincing behaviour change. KOMNAS data show that 97% of Indonesians are aware of 
avian influenza, but only 15% regard it as a direct threat to themselves and their families
147
. 
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Padmawati and Nichter (2008) found no farmers who expressed personal fear of avian influenza, with 
most speaking of avian influenza as some form of tetelo (Newcastle disease). What was feared more 
than illness was loosing chickens due to culling, or the price of chicken falling. One informant 
explained: 
 
The awareness among at risk groups is quite high but the perception of the risk is low, and 
changes in behaviour and practices are less than optimal. The community is only at the level 
of knowing, and people tend to forget. The next stage must go beyond the media and 
confront people face-to-face. We have to keep reminding people. When human cases 
decrease, people are not on the alert. Constant communications, year after year, are vital
148
. 
 
One of the greatest challenges for avian influenza communications in Indonesia is that there are so 
many different regions, cultures and groups involved. A respondent suggested: 
 
The usual idea with communications programmes is that you have one clear message. If you 
don’t have one message you risk confusing people. But here we need different messages for 
different groups. How do you reach cock-fighters and housewives with the same message? 
How do you communicate both with those who live in modern air-conditioned apartments 
and with those who live in  communal longhouses with no taps or toilets? It’s impossible. 
They key is trust and this is hard. You have to get the leaders to trust you first, community 
leaders, religious leaders. If they believe you, they can take the message to the community
149
. 
 
Another said: 
 
Culturally it’s very complicated. There is a tradition of authoritarian central control, and a very 
long tradition of people living close to animals, particularly chickens. You can’t change this 
sort of thing overnight. The relationship between humans and the environment is key. 
Washing your hands before eating might save you, but it won’t solve the problem. We need 
deeper reflection. The question is not just how to change habits, but how to change the way 
people live. That’s not easy150. 
 
Aside from targeted communications, other activities associated with the response have had 
powerful short-term effects on awareness, but little on long-term behaviour. In Jakarta, the capital, 
backyard birds were banned in January 2007, and moves were announced to move poultry markets 
and abattoirs out of residential areas
151
. It has proved difficult however to win public backing. One 
interviewee explained: 
 
In the first few months there were cullings. They were on TV. But this was only for three 
months and there was opposition in the press. Reporting concentrated on the concerns of 
low-income poultry farmers. This made the government reluctant to go forwards. The middle 
classes and the rich stood aside. This was not their concern. Democracy has a price. It is that 
the scale of priorities has been compromised
152
. 
 
Another informant said: 
 
There was a 50% price drop following the announcement. Those with flocks of five to 500 
were hardest hit. Around 40% - 60% of people who were making a living, or part of their living, 
from poultry had to find another job. Some did. That’s possible in Jakarta. Others just moved 
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their little farms from around their houses to unoccupied land nearby. The wet markets were 
seriously affected for about six months. Now you see live birds being sold again. The bottom 
line is that poultry numbers halved, poor people’s incomes dropped by one third, and you still 
see and hear birds in the city
153
. 
 
Another high-profile event was a three-day pandemic simulation involving nearly 1,000 people in 
Jembrana regency in Bali
154
. An attendee said: 
 
I was very impressed. Roles and responsibilities had been defined. There was disinfectant, 
food, drugs, transport. Things worked. It showed that this country is not the basket case most 
people make it out to be. Then, just two or three days later, it was back to normality, 
everybody seemed to have forgotten about it. But the question left hanging in my mind was: 
how do you contain panicking people without the army using their guns?
155
 
 
A comparison might be made between avian influenza and the threat of volcanic eruption, which is 
significant in Indonesia. The EM-DAT database
156
 identifies 130 active volcanoes in the country and 
lists 39 deadly eruptions in the last century. In the 19
th
 century, Krakatoa and Tambora, became 
famous worldwide for their devastating eruptions. Studying three highly volcanic areas on Java – 
Sumbing/Sindoro, Dieng and Merapi – Lavigne et al (2008) found only a few people aware of the 
volcanic threat. Nobody in the nearby communities was afraid of volcanic eruption, and in a number 
of instances, agriculture was actually being expanded upslope into more dangerous areas. Lavigne et 
al conclude that local people often underestimate the scientifically or statistically estimated risk, and 
that the perceived risk was very dependent on whether the volcano could be seen. Around Merapi, 
97% of those surveyed thought eruptions were an admonition from the supernatural world and did 
not see death as a negative event. Rather it was a regenerative process that should be accepted with 
human humility.  
 
These attitudes to the risk of volcanic eruption show similarities to those amongst the rural 
population in particular with respect to H5N1, as well as the strong sense of fatalism in society. If 
Indonesians have been living with chickens for centuries, they have been living with volcanoes for 
longer. Wildavsky (1979) posited both the environment and risk as social constructs, suggesting that 
individuals and groups with different world views will have different risk views. Douglas (1992) 
concurred from a more anthropological perspective: different societies fear different sorts of threats 
which correlate with differences in social structure. This cultural theory holds that people value things 
they participate in or identify with, and suggests a functionalist explanation: social structures 
generate attitudes that serve to uphold the social structure. Social organizations will emphasize the 
risks that hold the group together. Common values lead to common fears. What one sees depends on 
where one stands.  
 
Coupled with the disconnect that exists between the international response, which is driven, and 
funded, most significantly by the global public good associated with preventing a human influenza 
pandemic, and the weak Indonesian conception of a national public good (let alone one that links 
Indonesia with the rest of the world), there is a significant disconnect between the global 
construction of the risk associated with H5N1, and the Indonesian one. World views, social structures 
and values all differ radically between Washington DC (or London, Geneva and Rome) and the villages 
of western Java, or the low-rise sprawl of Jakarta’s periphery, so it is inevitable that there are going to 
be  radically different constructions of risk associated not just with H5N1, but almost everything. 
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Furthermore, in Indonesia’s stratified society, the rich and the poor, the urban and the rural, and 
many other groups, construct risks in widely varying ways. Which common values are going to lead to 
which common fears? Which groups are to be held together by commonly constructed risks? This 
makes the communications aspects of the response particularly challenging. Whose risks are really 
being addressed, and why? 
 
Another difficulty emerging from the number, scale and range of the internationally led 
communications initiatives, is working out what has had the most effect, especially concerning the 
thorny and important matter of provoking long-lasting behaviour change. Here the greatest value 
may be found in involving cohesive groups, such as Muhammadiyah and the Hotel & Restaurant 
Association, for example. They share common values, and so start closer to the position of sharing 
common constructions of the risk. Similarly, children can be more easily encouraged, as a first step, 
to see that they have commonalities, and are less dependent on existing values and routines. In risk 
communications, however, trust above all is imperative, especially trust in the institutions behind the 
messages (cf. Jasanoff 1982, Wynne 1992, and Irwin and Wynn 1996). As previously discussed this is 
lacking at many levels in Indonesia. 
 
VIRUSES AND SOVEREIGNTY 
 
The previous sections have shown how the response to HPAI in Indonesia has been hampered by 
political and bureaucratic processes, the lack of a coherent idea of a public good, especially a global 
one, and significantly different constructions of risk associated with the international organizations 
which are driving the response, and the people who are being affected by the disease, and the 
response. These themes coalesce in the geo-political storm which began on 20 December 2006, 
when Indonesia’s minister of health, Dr Siti Fadilah Supari, decided that the country would stop 
sending human H5N1 virus samples to the WHO as long as it followed the ‘imperialist’ GISN157 
mechanism (Supari 2008:24). It would only resume if the system were changed to give Indonesia 
control over where viruses originating from Indonesia went, and a share of profits resulting from 
research and commercialisation. Two years later, shockwaves are still rippling through the 
international health, diplomatic and academic communities
158
. Timely samples are vital to track 
changes in the virus, and the global community was quick to respond. In mid-February 2007, WHO 
representatives met with Supari and her team in Jakarta, offering anti-viral drug and vaccine supplies, 
and support for developing laboratory and vaccine manufacturing facilities. This smacked too much 
of ‘charity’ to Supari (ibid:33), and after seven hours of negotiations (with much energy apparently 
expended in trying to make Supari’s notion of ‘empowerment’ meet the WHO’s notion of ‘capacity 
building’), the matter remained unresolved. Supari was insisting on a Material Transfer Agreement 
(MTA) that recognised the viruses as Indonesian, and the WHO was required to “establish the 
mechanisms for more open virus and information sharing and accessibility to avian influenza and 
other potential pandemic influenza vaccines for developing countries”. One model was the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources
159
. Another was the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, which recognizes the sovereign right of states over genetic resources
160
. 
 
A more public series of events followed. In late March, two ‘high level’ meetings were convened in 
Jakarta, which included 13 ministers from ‘like-minded’ countries, and resulted in the ‘Jakarta 
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Declaration’161. In mid-April, a meeting in Geneva ended deadlocked, but the 60th World Health 
Assembly (WHA) in May saw the ‘Jakarta Declaration’ included as resolution 60.28, Supari elected to 
the WHO executive board, and three samples released. The resolution received support from 24 
countries including Iran, North Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Cuba and Myanmar; and at the first Non-Aligned 
Movement Health Ministers’ Meeting, held in conjunction with the WHA, 112 countries voiced their 
concern at existing arrangements. In June, civil groups from around 50 Asian and African countries 
announced the ‘Bandung Message’ from a meeting in West Java, and in November and December, 
tense negotiations continued at an intergovernmental meeting in Geneva, and at the international 
ministerial conference on avian and pandemic influenza in Delhi. 
 
Despite an international diplomatic offensive, during 2008 Supari has remained robustly unswayed. 
February saw the publication of her book, Saatnya Dunia Berubah Tangan Tuhan di Balik Flu Burung, 
in English: ‘It’s Time for the World to Change, Divine Hand behind Avian Influenza’. In April she made 
charges of spying against Jakarta-based US Naval Medical Research Unit Two (NAMRU-2)
162
 and in 
May, she announced that H5N1 human cases, and deaths, would no longer be reported on a case-by-
case basis to the press. Throughout, at public meetings, Supari has accused the WHO of colluding 
with rich world pharmaceutical companies to trick poor nations into giving away virus samples, to be 
processed into drugs and vaccines that are then denied to countries that can’t afford them. “The 
conspiracy between superpower nations and global organizations is a reality,” she is quoted as saying. 
“It isn’t a theory, isn’t rhetoric, but it’s something I’ve experienced myself”163. 
 
Few in the international community fail to accept that Supari has raised an important matter that 
needs addressing, but her intransigence in the face of increased global transparency
164
 and genuine 
offers of support has caused an unusual mixture of hurt and confusion. There are some tricky issues 
at the root of the matter. With global (seasonal influenza) vaccine production capacity currently 
running at no more than 500 million doses annually, and a total population of over six billion, a large 
number of people are certain never to see any vaccine in any circumstances. There are also doubts as 
to whether the virus actually originates from Indonesia, and questions emerge which are almost 
philosophical. An interviewee asked: 
 
Even if you accept that the virus is Indonesian, what happens if an Australian, say, gets 
infected, and goes home? Does the virus then become Australian? Or does it even become 
the personal property of the patient? It is an impossible matter to wrap up legally
165
. 
 
Another respondent said: 
 
Everyone agrees with the basic point, but Supari has overplayed her hand. Her motivation is a 
mystery, but I’d say the problem boils down to a poor understanding of the issues. She was 
instructed by the president to buy a stockpile of drugs, but didn’t have the money. So she’s 
scratching her head when Indonesian viruses start turning up in prototype vaccines
166
 and 
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she thinks ‘Bingo!’ Now she’s dug herself into a hole and she’s turned it into a bigger crusade. 
Speculatively, I’d say that she is also looking to deflect attention from her failures, and not 
just with avian influenza. It’s sad. It’s not an easy problem and she should not take it 
personally
167
. 
 
Other analysts see a wider agenda. One interviewee suggested: 
 
In case it’s not obvious, the whole matter is driven by nationalism. The main tension in the 
country is now between Islamic nationalism and secular nationalism, and Siti is trying to play 
both cards. The nationalists are getting more strident, and it’s pushing to extremes, verging 
on paranoia. It’s not difficult to work through her logic168. 
 
Supari’s own writings back this up: 
 
For a second time
169
 Indonesia would lead other developing countries, which for a long time 
had been the victims of the greediness of the people of developed countries in the field of 
health. With spirit burning in my chest, I determined not to step backwards. “Ever onward, no 
retreat,” as Soekarno, the first President of the Republic of Indonesia, put it. Bismillaahi 
rahmaanir rahiim! (ibid:25). 
 
Supari has also put her Islamic faith at the centre of her struggle, claiming divine guidance, and is 
reputed to be associated with groups such as Hizbut Tahrir, which believes in replacing Indonesia's 
secular government with a Muslim caliphate. Elson (2008:53) offers a detailed exposition of the 
complexities of Indonesian nationalism, which fits the situation well: an ongoing project characterised 
by ‘a confused and unproductive tension between leaders’ assumed roles as popular agents of their 
people’s drive towards modernity and their desire to retain or restore what they see as essentially 
“Indonesian”’. Citing Weinstein (1971), he suggests that a long-established view of the international 
realm as ‘distant, unreliable, powerful’ and essentially unsympathetic to Indonesian interests, 
continues to enjoy broad support.  
 
A cardiologist before being selected in 2004, Supari “came from nowhere” according to one 
interviewee: 
 
Her appointment was a surprise. Maybe she was useful to fill a quota of four women in the 
cabinet. Or it might have been because she is not a member of any political party. Some say 
that she is a friend of SBY’s wife, which would not have done her any harm, either. In any case, 
2009 is election year and there are rumours that she’s looking for the vice president position. 
That means that she must not be seen to be pushed around. She has to drive it through. 
Alternatively, the elections might mean the end of the problem
170
. 
 
Another respondent suggested: “You need a psychologist’s analysis maybe, but she might see herself 
as being in competition with some of the other women in the cabinet
171
. The explanations are not 
necessarily rational”172. Nevertheless, Supari is winning over the masses. Lifestyle magazines profile 
her as a ‘hero’ of Indonesia, and the weekly television programme which she hosts (and sponsors) is 
popular viewing. Informed Indonesians, however, profess to be mystified by her persistence, asking: 
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“Indonesia does not have stated objectives. Just ‘equity’. How do you negotiate with someone who 
does not know what they want?”173 Others see a simple logic at play: “This is a very quid pro quo 
culture, where everything is negotiated. Siti realises that the threat of widespread avian influenza, or 
worse a human pandemic, has economic value, and is looking to milk it”174.  
 
No matter what the logic might be, according to one informant: 
 
Everything is bogged down. The ministry is not happy with WHO and WHO is not happy with 
the ministry. Nothing is moving. We can’t even get agreements signed to disburse money we 
have waiting. In one case we have been waiting over a year. We talk to our friends and 
colleagues in the hierarchy and they apologise saying there is ‘anti-western sentiment’ at the 
top. It’s insane175.  
 
Another interviewee paints a blacker picture: 
 
Everyone has been polite so far because she has a fair point. But let’s say their patience runs 
out and they [the international community] decide to play hard ball. They turn the money 
taps off, pull the troops [vets, medics, agronomists, communications people] out, point a 
satellite at the country, and watch the virus kill every chicken in the country, and then start 
taking the children
176
. 
 
This debate over the ‘nationality’ of a virus has provoked unprecedented passion, and despair, on 
both the Indonesian side and that of the organizations charged with responsibility for global health. 
The international response to Severe Acquired Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 was seen as an 
almost ideal model of global cooperation and coordinated action to bring a new and dangerous 
disease under control. Similarly, the new International Health Regulations (2005)
177
 (which were 
actually implemented early by some countries in response to H5N1) were seen by many as a break-
through in global understanding, cooperation, and cross border disease control. Yet, despite signing 
up to IHR 2005, Indonesia has thrown this optimistic new world order in doubt. Few would disagree 
that the system did not need revising to give poor and middle-income countries more say, and better 
access to affordable medicine. Similarly, few would disagree that Supari’s actions are reprehensible if 
motivated purely by personal political ambition, and it is easy to see unfashionable nationalistic 
narratives in the debate as well as more fashionable pro-South ones. More worryingly, it also appears 
that religious disjuncture is being exploited. But Supari has seen first-hand the move away from a 
paternalistic conception of power in her own country to a noisy sort of anarcho-democracy, and she 
is doing little more than reproducing this shift on the world’s stage. Yet again the rational, technical 
and universalist solutions of the 21
st
 century global community come unstuck in the Indonesian 
political, economic, social and cultural context. The consequences for the health of the world, and 
more importantly for Supari, the consequences for the health of the Indonesian people, are not yet 
known. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
“Unless we are all prepared, no one is prepared.” 
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The globally driven response to highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) has seen some tremendous 
successes. Between 2006 and 2008, the number of countries reporting H5N1 reduced from 53 to 19, 
and in 2008, just eight countries were responsible for 90% of outbreaks
178
. Before 2003, HPAI was 
rare, with only 20 outbreaks reported between 1959 and 2003 (caused by H5N1 and other subtypes 
of the virus)
179
. Since then there have been an uncountable number of outbreaks, and roughly 2.5bn 
of the estimated 18bn poultry birds in the world have been killed by the disease, or culled to prevent 
its spread
180
. As yet, H5N1 has not mutated, or reassorted, into a form that transmits between 
humans, but other subtypes of the virus caused at least two of the last century’s three major 
influenza pandemics. The 1968-69 event resulted in over 700,000 deaths (WHO 2005), and in 2005 
the World Bank estimated that an influenza pandemic would cost the world economy around US$800 
billion (World Bank 2005). 
 
Between 1940 and 2004, 335 new infectious diseases emerged globally, over half of which (60.3%) 
were zoonoses – diseases resulting from pathogens transmitted from animals to humans (Jones et al 
2008:990). Such zoonotic Emerging Infectious Diseases (EIDs) include Marburg and Ebola 
hemorrhagic fevers, Nipah virus encephalitis, Lassa fever, SARS, and HIV/AIDS. Glinski and Kostro 
(2005) suggest that 75% of future epidemics will result from zoonoses. In these circumstances, HPAI 
is not only “one of the most devastating animal diseases in the world”181, but also an invaluable 
example of one of the greatest threats facing humankind. This has resulted in an unprecedented 
gathering of global forces around the ‘One World One Health’ concept182, focusing on the animal-
human-ecosystems interface. Jones et al (2008) suggest that EID origins are significantly correlated 
with socio-economic as well environmental and ecological factors. Disease ecology is entwined with 
social, environmental and technological change, which is occurring at an increasing rate, particularly 
in developing countries, where a growing population lives in increasingly densely inhabited areas in 
conditions that have major consequences for trans-species virus transfers (cf. Bloom et al 2007). 
South East Asia, in particular, has been identified as a major ‘hot zone’ due to the massive growth in 
pig, fowl and other domestic animal populations in the last 25 years.  
 
Indonesia, particularly western Java and the area around the capital, Jakarta, offers a prime example of 
these conditions. The free-ranging ducks and paddy (rice) fields that have been implicated in studies 
of HPAI in other South East Asian countries (cf. Gilbert et al 2008) are also present. Many factors – 
size, geography, ecology, politics, and socio-economics – conspire against the control of HPAI in 
Indonesia, but a remarkably dense population living closely with a remarkable number of poultry, and 
other birds, makes the response a severe challenge, and despite a greater effort than anywhere in the 
world, greater funding, and some valuable local successes, the disease is still widespread. The 
opportunity presents to build on the H5N1 response to encompass other diseases at the human-
animal interface. In Indonesia there is little scope for the ‘fatigue’ reported elsewhere183. 
 
At the Sixth International Ministerial Conference on Avian and Pandemic Influenza, held in Sharm el-
Sheikh, Egypt, 25-26 October 2008, a high level review, prefaced by the observation quoted at the 
beginning of this section, identified seven factors as crucial to success in responding to the 
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disease
184
. The first was high level political commitment. The second was the ability to scale up in key 
sectors, with improved management of veterinary and medical services, and transparent sharing of 
information, given as the third. The fourth was clear incentives to encourage reporting, with effective 
compensation schemes, and the fifth, effective strategic alliances of civil society, the private sector, 
and all levels of government. The sixth identified research, product development and technology 
transfer, and the seventh, collective government support for mass communications on HPAI and 
healthy behaviour. 
 
This paper has indicated that Indonesia is challenged in all these areas, except some aspects of the 
last. Despite the attention of some determined and dedicated individuals, the national government is 
not committed to eradicating the disease, nor are there significant demands for this to happen from 
the population, or the poultry industry. Many other pressing priorities exist for all groups, and the 
situation is complicated greatly by an ongoing process of finely grained decentralization, and a weak 
regulatory environment. Scaling up and improving the management of veterinary and medical 
services in Indonesia will be the work of decades rather than years, given the low levels currently 
existing, as the challenges of disbursing funds into them have shown
185
. Incentives to encourage 
reporting are at best patchy given the confusion and inconsistent regimes of compensation attached 
to culling infected birds, and the stigma and unwelcome attention of owning them. The high levels of 
disease reported from Indonesia are due entirely to Ministry of Agriculture teams actively searching 
for it. Regarding transparent sharing of information, research, product development and technology 
transfer, again Indonesia starts from a low baseline
186
 and political wrangling emanating from the 
Ministry of Health has made even dialogue designed to move these elements in the right direction 
difficult. Finally, effective strategic alliances of civil society, the private sector, and all levels of 
government suffer from the wider conceptual challenges given below, as do nearly all other aspects 
of the response.  
 
Three main conceptual factors underlie the relative failure of Indonesia to address HPAI effectively. 
The first is the lack, or emergent form, of a modern Weberian bureaucracy, coupled with the 
assumption by many in the international agencies leading the H5N1 response – mainly based in 
Rome, Geneva, Paris and Washington – that such does, can, or should exist. According to Rosen 
(1993:215) cited in Wald (2008:17) epidemics indicate the need for regulation with “terrifying 
urgency” and set in motion “the administrative machinery for disease prevention, sanitary 
supervision, and, in general, protection of community health”. Europe has lived with the idea of the 
‘medical police’ (Medizinischpolizei) for 250 years, and has partially been formed by it, but such a 
concept really only arrived in Indonesia with the HPAI response. Paul Farmer (1996:261) quotes David 
Satcher (1995:3), then director of the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC): “the 
health of the individual is best ensured by maintaining or improving the health of the entire 
community,” but goes on to ask: ‘what constitutes the entire community?’ In Indonesia’s dynamic 
young democracy, the answer is far from clear, and the rational, legalistic, bureaucratic response 
based on surveillance, intervention and control runs into difficulty. In actor network terms, the 
situation is characterised by a very large number of actors, sharing few commonalities, which are only 
now beginning to coalesce into the sort of networks that might yield coherent action. A simplified 
actor network diagram is presented in Appendix E.     
 
The second, and related, factor underlying the challenges in Indonesia, is a mismatch between the 
clear moral right, and imperatives, that the international community associates with acting in pursuit 
of a (global) public good, and again, the lack, or emergent form, of such a concept in Indonesia. Inside 
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this vast, diverse and rapidly developing country, clannish, regional, and socially stratified 
conceptions of common goods exist, but the idea that there is a good of benefit to every Indonesian 
finds little traction. This is reflected in Indonesia’s international interactions, where there is an 
undeveloped understanding that the people of Indonesia share commonalities with those of the rest 
of the world, especially those in industrialized countries, and an overdeveloped understanding that 
there is political capital to be gained by suggesting they don’t. Indonesia’s young and ex-colonial 
national identity is so challenged by internal diversity – ethnic, cultural and socio-economic – that it 
has little option but to lean heavily on the idea of ‘otherness’. 
 
The third, and most pertinent, conceptual factor relates to a wider domain than H5N1 in Indonesia. 
Put simply, scientific experts cannot just prescribe and expect obedience. This increasingly difficult 
relationship between science and society (cf. Jasanoff 1990 and 2004, Renn 1992, Stirling 1999, Van 
Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005) can be seen in attitudes to nuclear power, genetically modified 
organisms, nanotechnology and even global climate change. The H5N1 virus is a construction of 
science, and science, particularly bio-medicine, an emerging mesh of power relations linking health, 
industry, institutionalism and governance, has constructed the threat, designed the response, and 
defined its own terms of success and failure. Faced with such a consistent and clearly constructed 
threat – an invisible virus – the global response can only present as a consistent, unified discourse, a 
paradigm of centrally planned and enacted intervention. Yet science’s truths are not universal. Its 
boundaries and competencies are drawn differently by different people, whose voices and alternative 
approaches may be obscured by the prominence and power of science. Context, as well as trust in the 
individuals and institutions making prescriptions, therefore matters, and Indonesia’s context, as has 
been shown, is diverse, complex, and as yet unsympathetic to modernist models of authority and 
rationality. The narratives – the storylines – of the international organizations do not fit naturally, or 
necessarily, with those that exist or are emerging nationally, and to ignore this – as well as to assume 
a rational technocracy – risks generating uncertainty and unexpected outcomes. 
 
Furthermore, if scientific knowledge is created by people and institutions with particular situated and 
partial perspectives, it will ask partial questions responding to partial interests (Fairhead and Leach 
2003). Given that scientists frame policy issues by defining what evidence is significant and available, 
and policy-makers frame scientific enquiry by defining what is relevant, unhelpful self-sustaining 
routines of co-production can emerge, which are shaped by political and economic forces (cf. 
Jasanoff and Wynne 1998). Interests therefore align in a particular historical-cultural context, which 
can be called the political economy. Given Indonesia’s diversity, complexity, history and current 
position in geo-politics, it is in this realm that new ways to engage civil society, create effective public-
private partnerships, and generate genuine trust must be found. 
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APPENDIX  B: COMPARATIVE DATA FOR INDONESIA 
 
National facts 
and figures 
Total population 225,630,000 (2007, WDI - 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/POP.pdf)  
Total land area (km
2
) 1,905,000 (2005, WDI - 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/table1_1.pdf)  
First H5N1 outbreak August 2003, Pekalongan, Central Java (Ministry of Agriculture quoted in Jakarta Post 
26/1/04). Outbreaks ongoing at December 2008. 
First human death, numbers to date First confirmed death - 12/07/2005, 113 deaths to 12/12/2008 (WHO - 
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2008_12_09/en/index.html)  
Numbers of poultry 
Note: difference sources give 
different estimates. 
1. The overall broiler population in 2007 is estimated at 889 million birds. Out of the total 
poultry population, 69% are estimated to be broilers, 21% native chicken, and 7% layers. 
(USDA Indonesia Poultry And Products Poultry Annual 2007 quoted at 
http://www.thepoultrysite.com/articles/901/indonesia-poultry-and-products-poultry-
annual-2007)  
2. The poultry population in Indonesia comprises: broilers: 919.7 million, indigenous poultry: 
87.3 million, layers: 85.1 million, ducks: 48.1 million (FAO EMPRES Transboundary Animal 
Diseases Bulletin 25) 
3. According to livestock statistics from 2007, Indonesia has an estimated standing 
population of 317 million native/village poultry, 106 million layers, 175 million broilers 
and around 35 million ducks. Thus, more than 620 million chicken and ducks are 
estimated to be the standing population of the country. (Sumiarto and Arifin 2008:9). 
Poultry export value None (http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/ah876e/ah876e14.htm)  
Structure of industry (FAO Sectors 1-
4) 
Sector 1: 9.7m: Sector 2: 58.2m: Sector 3: 32.39m: Sector 4: 175m; Total 275.29m (Rushton et 
al 2005:5 citing data from CASERED 2004) 
National GDP US$432,817,000 (current) (2007, WDI - 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf)  
Agriculture as % of GDP (poultry 
industry as % of agric GDP) 
The agriculture sector contributes 14% to the country’s GDP and employs nearly 40% of the 
active population (January 2008, FITA - http://www.fita.org/countries/indonesia.html). The 
contribution of the livestock sector to agricultural GDP in 2006 was 12.75% (Sumiarto and 
Arifin 2008:6). No data is available on the poultry industry within the livestock sector. 
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Aid dependency (% GDP) In 2005, Indonesia received US$2,524,000 net official development assistance. This compares 
with US$1,654,000 in 2000. The 2005 figure represents 0.9% of Gross National Income, or 
US$11 per capita. (WDI - 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/table6_11.pdf)  
Risk, 
uncertainty, 
perceptions 
Major hazards/disasters since 2004 2004: February - earthquake in Papua; October - car bomb in Jakarta; December - Indian 
Ocean tsunami. 2005: March - earthquake off Sumatra; October - passenger aircraft crash in 
Medan; October - suicide bombings on Bali. 2006: April - mudflow in East Java; May - 
earthquake near Yogyakarta in central Java; July - earthquake off Java; December - ferry sinks in 
Java Sea. 2007: January - passenger aircraft crash off Sulawesi; February - floods in Jakarta. 
Framing of risk/uncertainty in policy Indonesia suffers regular natural and man-made disasters. Avian influenza is seen as one of 
several lethal poultry diseases which hit poor small-holders particularly. The threat to humans 
is only one of a number challenges to the health system. 
Social constructions of risk and 
uncertainty by public 
Indonesia is a numinous society. There is very little understanding of the idea of a human 
influenza pandemic. Poultry consumption falls temporarily, and behaviour changes 
temporarily, following reports of avian influenza outbreaks, or human deaths. Dengue is widely 
perceived as more dangerous. 
Media coverage of avian influenza Avian influenza is widely reported in the press on television news. There have also been 
extensive public service announcements relating to avian influenza on television. 
Politics, 
governance 
and political 
culture 
Styles of decision-making in 
bureaucracy 
Indonesia’s system of government is both presidential and parliamentary in style, and displays 
strong tendencies towards political compromise. Since 2001 the country has seen far-
reaching decentralization. Despite some bright spots, the civil service is broadly seen as 
inefficient and ineffective. 
Patronage politics and influence on 
policy 
Efforts are being made to counter the ‘corruption, cronyism and nepotism’ of the past, but 
some commentators suggest a high degree of continuity exists between the new democratic 
politics and those of the authoritarian past. 
Form of democracy – role of civil 
society 
Parliamentary democracy with a directly elected president, and significant regional autonomy. 
Protests and demonstrations by civil society are frequent and widespread. 
State structure – level of 
decentralization 
Indonesia is a republic which has seen significant decentralization since 2001. Now 456 
autonomous local governments are responsible for major sectors such as education, health, 
culture, public works and the environment, as well as raising revenue. 
Regulatory cultures/styles Historically authoritarian and top-down. Now highly decentralized. 
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HPAI response Major donors/international agencies 
involved in avian influenza (rank?) 
Major donors include: USAID, World Bank, AusAID (also the governments of Germany, Japan 
and the Netherlands). International implementing agencies include UN FAO, UN WHO, 
UNOCHA and UNICEF. Bilateral support includes that from US Department of Agriculture 
Foreign Agricultural Service.  
NGOs, civil society groups involved The Indonesian Red Cross (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies) 
and Muhammadiyah (a faith-based organization) are significantly involved. Many other 
national and international NGOs – such as Save the Children, CARE, Vision International - are, 
or have been, involved in smaller projects. 
Key interventions for HPAI control 
and response 
The January 2006 National Strategic Plan for Avian Influenza Control and Pandemic 
Preparedness outlines ten strategies based on principles advocated by the FAO, the WHO and 
the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE): 1. Control in animals; 2. Management of 
human cases; 3. Protection of high-risk groups; 4. Epidemiological surveillance for animals and 
humans; 5. Restructuring the poultry industry; 6. Risk communication, information and public 
awareness; 7. Strengthening relevant laws; 8. Capacity building; 9. Action research; 10. 
Monitoring and evaluation. In August 2006 a decision was made to prioritize strategies 1., 4. 
and 6. as they were considered to impact more rapidly on the spread of the virus and thereby 
reduce the number of human cases. 
Areas of government responsible – 
coordination 
Departemen Pertanian (Deptan), the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and Departemen Kesehatan 
(Depkes), the Ministry of Health (MoH) are primarily involved, with national co-ordination 
provided by the Komiti Nasional Pengendalian Flu Burung dan Kesiapsiagaan Menghadapi 
Pendemi Influenza (KOMNAS FBPI), the National Committee for Avian Influenza Control and 
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness. This is a ministerial-level committee, headed by the 
Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare, which has 14 members, including the Agriculture, 
Health, Forestry, National Planning (Bappenas) and Industry ministers, the Economics co-
ordinating minister, the army commander, the police chief, and the chairman of the 
Indonesian Red Cross. 
 Vaccine/drug manufacturing 
capacity 
No human vaccine, or anti-viral drug, production capacity. PT. Medion in Bandung has 
significant poultry vaccine production capacity, and PT. Vaksindo, and PT. IPB Shigeta Animal 
Pharmaceuticals, a collaboration between Bogor Agricultural University (IPB) and SHIGETA 
Animal Pharmaceuticals Inc. Japan, have smaller capacities. 
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APPENDIX C: LAYER MARKET CHAIN IN NORTH SUMATRA. 
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Source: 'Poultry Market Chain Study in North Sumatra' by Albiner Siagian, Philipus Sembiring, 
Zulfikar Siregar, Ma'ruf Tafsin, Nevy Diana Hanafi, Rasmaliah, Dwi Suryanto, and Rosdanelli 
Hasibuan (OSRO/INT/501/NET). FAO (undated) Page 16 
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APPENDIX D: ROAD MAP OF KAMPONG CHICKENS IN BALI 
Road map of kampong chickens in Bali. Source: 'Poultry Market Chain Study in Bali' by Made Mastika (OSRO/RAS/602/JPN) FAO (undated) Figure 4 
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APPENDIX E: ACTOR NETWORK DIAGRAM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
